# Johnson v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · November 16, 1988 · 760 S.W.2d 277

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9766877

## Case

- **Full name:** Thomas Carl JOHNSON & Robert Darnell Stapp, Appellants, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** November 16, 1988
- **Citations:** 760 S.W.2d 277; 1988 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 247; 1988 WL 121274
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Teague
- **Judges:** Campbell, Clinton, Davis, Miller, Onion, Teague
- **Cited by:** 188 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9766877

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that, when considering self-representation on appeal, the record must also show that the appellant fully understands the practical disadvantages of self-representation, including the fact that he will not be granted any special considerations regarding or relief from th…
- stating, " ‘a patient trial judge may allow both counsel and the accused to jointly participate in the case.' ”
- noting that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and are not granted any special consideration

## Opinion text

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion concludes from the record that (1) the record affirmatively establishes that the appellants were properly admonished of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and (2) they knowingly and intelligently waived their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because I do not believe the record on appeal supports the majority’s conclusions, I respectfully dissent.
It is true, when it comes to the trial court ascertaining whether the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), does not require a trial judge to literally cover the waterfront with the accused when he admonishes him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Thus, the trial judge need not commence from the day the accused was born and thereafter cover every conceivable legal question that might arise during the trial of the case. However, *292 because each case must be decided on its own merits, just what minimum admonishments must be made by the trial judge cannot be formulated in such a manner so as to cover all situations.
A careful reading of the pertinent portions of the record in this cause, which concern the trial judge admonishing appellants of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, reflects only the following: he ascertained that they knew what offense they were charged with committing; that they knew what punishment they faced in the event they were found guilty; informed them that “[t]he jury selection requires the questioning of a jury panel to determine whether or not there can be a fair and impartial jury”; and informed them that they could ask the prospective jurors questions. He specifically asked appellant Stapp the following question: “Do you think you can conduct the cross examination of the witnesses on your case?”, and received an affirmative reply. In my view, the above is insufficient to adequately establish that the appellants were properly admonished of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. I dissent to the majority opinion holding to the contrary.
Furthermore, when a trial judge, as here, makes such statements as the following to an accused, namely, “I will insist that Counsel, [who had just been fired by appellants], be present to assist with you. Do you understand?”; “Now I’m going to require that [counsel] be present, and I’m going to require that he lend you assistance, advisory, and that he also assist in the jury selection.”; “but I think [counsel] should voir dire the jury for you”; “but I’m going to have [counsel] be present throughout this trial ...,” and the like, any acquiescence from the accused in the form of saying “Yes, sir” to the trial judge, as occurred here, only reflects the exhibition and display of respectful conduct toward an authoritative figure who has just exclaimed for the world to hear what he intended to do, and is not acquiescent to an “arrangement” that counsel would always be present “in an advisory capacity,” as the majority opinion declares. In this instance, appellant’s assent to what the trial judge stated most certainly does not reflect the affirmative fact that counsel was accepted by the appellants with outstretched arms, as the majority opinion implies took place.
Because the constitutional rights of the appellants were violated by the trial court, the convictions should be reversed and not affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9766877. Public record. Not legal advice.