# Rebsamen Motor Co. v. Phillips > Supreme Court of Arkansas · April 2, 1956 · 226 Ark. 146 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9766594 ## Case - **Full name:** Rebsamen Motor Company v. Phillips - **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas - **Decided:** April 2, 1956 - **Citations:** 226 Ark. 146; 289 S.W.2d 170; 57 A.L.R. 2d 1256; 1956 Ark. LEXIS 405 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Ward - **Judges:** Holt, Ward, Smith, Seamsteb - **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9766594 ## Opinion text Paul Ward, Associate Justice (dissenting). I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion herein which holds Act 182 of 1955, relating to the distribution and sale of motor vehicles, unconstitutional. The majority opinion, as I understand it, assigns three reasons or grounds for the conclusion reached. They are: (a) Act 182 makes an arbitrary and therefore an unconstitutional classification; (b) A similar act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, and; (c) Act 182 attempts au illegal delegation of legislative power to tbe Commission. I shall discuss the above reasons or grounds in the order named. (a) The majority find that the legislature has no constitutional right to require a license fee from a franchised dealer who deals in new and used cars, and allow a used car dealer to sell new and used cars without having to pay any license fee. It seems to me that this view overlooks entirely the main features and main purpose of said Act 182. The act itself is rather lengthy and much of it is devoted to definitions and setting up the Commission and the rules and regulations governing it. It would serve no useful purpose to set out the provision of the act at any length because, as I understand the act and its purpose, the real gist of the enactment revolves around Section 5(g)(1). In effect this portion of the act is designed to prevent an automobile manufacturing company from forcing a local dealer in this state to accept and pay for more automobiles than the dealer orders, or can dispose of at the price at which he is required to sell them. It is very plain not only from the act but from common knowledge that this situation just described could exist only between a manufacturer and its authorized dealers. Consequently there is no occasion, and the act makes no attempt, to regulate used car dealers or “bootleg” new car dealers. As a matter of fact it seems clear to me that if this act is allowed to stand and its provisions are enforced there will be no more “bootleg” dealers in new cars. The majority opinion has not discussed the purposes of the act or the evils which it is designed to eliminate, and therefore there is no point in attempting to show that there is a necessity for regulations of the kind here involved for the protection of the general economy and public welfare as set forth in Section 1 of the act. The fact that many other states have enacted laws very similar'to Act 182 and some have gone unchallenged for 15 years or. more is itself a reason why this court should not strike down this act unless it clearly appears to be unconstitutional. The law is well settled that acts of the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and every reasonable intendment to that end should be indulged. The following states have enactments containing the same meaning and almost the same wording as Section 5(g)(1) referred to above, see: Wisconsin Stats., 1953, Chapter 218.01 et seq. and particularly subparagraph 15 at page 2771; West’s Louisiana Stats. Annotated, Yol. 18, Sec. 32:1255(8) (b) at page 100; Colorado Rev. Stats. 1953, Section 13-11-14-(9) (a), at page 202; Code of Virginia, Yol. 7, Chapter 7, Article 3, Section 46-534(1) at page 171; Florida Stats., Chapter 320, Section 64(5); Tennessee Code Annotated, Yol. 10, Sec. 59-1714(g) (1); 47 Oklahoma Stats. Annotated, Section 565(g) (1) at page 386, and; Public Laws of Rhode Island 1949-50, Chapter 2595, Article VIII, Section 2(5), at page 1255. My limited investigation reveals that several other states have laws somewhat similar in purpose to Act 182. A few of which are Iowa, South Dakota, Michigan, Ohio and Mississippi. While some of the regulatory acts by other states have been in force for more than 15 years no decision has been called to my attention and I have been unable to find one which has directly passed upon the constitutionality of the main features of Act 182. In the case of Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488 , 71 N. W. 2d 420 , the Supreme Court upheld appellee’s right to cancel a contract with its dealer, appellant. It did so upon the ground that the contract giving the right of cancellation was entered into before the Motor Vehicle Act was passed, which act had the same provision in it that is in Act 182. The Motor Vehicle Act was discussed at length and there is every indication that the Wisconsin Court considered the act constitutional, but did not think it should impair an existing contract. One of the judges dissented on the point above mentioned but no judge suggested that the act was unconstitutional as to future contracts. (b) The majority quote a headnote from the case of Nelson, et al. v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327 , 289 N. W. 388 (1939), leaving the impression, perhaps, that the' Supreme Court of Nebraska has held unconstitutional an act like the one here under consideration. A careful reading of the decision in that case justifies no such impression. It is true that in the Nebraska statute there is the same language as that found in Act 182 and referred to particularly as Section 5(g)(1) noted above. If may be significant that the Nebraska Court found no fault with this part of the act. The court did however find objections, as shown at page 392, to certain language in the act which is not found in Act 182. That language limited a dealer to selling only the kind of an automobile that his license specified. (c) The majority opinion concludes that the language in Section 3(d) constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Commission to employ and pay a secretary and necessary clerical help. The expense for this help is to be paid out of the fees provided for in the act, and is not an attempt to expend state money without an appropriation. Such procedure is not at all unusual. When the legislature created the Licensing Board for Contractors it provided in Ark. Stats. § 71-706 that “The Board shall be further empowered to employ an Assistant Secretary . . . and whose salary shall not exceed $1,800 per year.” In the act regulating real estate brokers and salesmen it is provided, Ark. Stats. § 71-603 (f) that from the fees collected the Board shall pay all incident expenses including not to exceed $5.00 a day to an examiner. Other instances of similar legislation could be cited and I know of no decision by this court holding any of them unconstitutional. The payment of expenses provided for in Act 182 are merely incidental to and necessary for the effective operation of the Commission which it creates. These provisions in no way violate our holding in Gipson v. Crawfis, 225 Ark. 903 , 286 S. W. 2d 336 , relied on by the majority. Chief Justice Seamsteb, joins in this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9766594. Public record. Not legal advice.