# Post v. Mendel > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 27, 1986 · 510 Pa. 213 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9765462 ## Case - **Full name:** Barton L. POST, Appellant, v. M. Mark MENDEL, Appellee - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** March 27, 1986 - **Citations:** 510 Pa. 213; 507 A.2d 351; 1986 Pa. LEXIS 742 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Papadakos - **Judges:** Nix, Flaherty, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos, Larsen, McDermott - **Cited by:** 100 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9765462 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that an attorney’s act in sending a letter detailing acts of misconduct by his opposing counsel to the presiding judge, the Disciplinary Board, opposing counsel and a client of opposing counsel, was not subject to judicial immunity because it was neither issued in the … - stating that there was no immunity for an attorney’s statements about an adversary made in a disparaging letter to the Disciplinary Board because the statements were not made in the pleadings, during argument in the case, or during trial, but, rather, “took the form of an extr… - finding that the judicial privilege did not protect an attorney from liability for statements he made in a letter detailing alleged acts of misconduct by his opposing attorney, where the letter was mailed to opposing counsel, the presiding judge, the disciplinary board, and th… - finding that judicial privilege did not apply to a letter sent by trial counsel accusing opposing counsel of unethical behavior during the course of an on-going trial because it was immaterial to the relief sought or to the legal claims raised in that proceeding - holding that a defamatory letter sent to a judge was not protected by the judicial privilege because it was not relevant to the pending proceedings and transmittal of the letter would not “logically have been expected to affect the course of trial” ## Opinion text PAPADAKOS, Justice, dissenting. I must dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that the subject communication was not sent in the regular course of preparing for contemplated proceedings against Appellant. A reading of the communication indicates, in the clearest *225 possible language, that the letter itself was notice to Appellant that Appellee was filing charges against him with the Disciplinary Board. The letter itself is the formal complaint against Appellant which was forwarded to the Board. The copies of the letter to the trial judge and Dr. Simon were pertinent, material, and in the regular course of procedure because these individuals were involved in the alleged improper conduct of Appellant and could very well be called upon by the Disciplinary Board in its investigation of Appellee’s complaint. Accordingly, they clearly had an interest in the proceedings which might ensue before the Disciplinary Board. I would hold this communication protected as made prior to the institution of proceedings (Restatement of Torts, § 586) and would affirm the order of Superior Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9765462. Public record. Not legal advice.