# Nelson v. Timberline International, Inc.

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · March 5, 1998 · 332 Ark. 165

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9765133

## Case

- **Full name:** Alvie NELSON v. TIMBERLINE INTERNATIONAL, INC.; Crum & Forster, Carrier; And Second Injury Fund
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** March 5, 1998
- **Citations:** 332 Ark. 165; 964 S.W.2d 357; 1998 Ark. LEXIS 168
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Imber
- **Judges:** Thornton, Glaze, Corbin, Imber
- **Cited by:** 16 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9765133

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that while stare decisis is a guiding principle, prior interpretations of worker’s compensation statute must be overruled because the interpretations were wrong

## Opinion text

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice., dissenting. There are two fundamental principles of statutory construction that prevent me from joining the majority. The first, as the majority acknowledges, is that statutes and constitutions:
should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation so that they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time, and a different thing at another time. Certainly, when a constitutional provision or a statute has been construed, and that construction consistently followed for many years, such construction should not be changed.
Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53 , 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993); Southwest Ark. Communications, Inc. v. Arrington, 296 Ark. 141 , 753 S.W.2d 267 (1988); O’Daniel v. Brunswick Balke Collender Co., 195 Ark. 669 , 113 S.W.2d 717 (1938); Tindall v. Searan, 192 Ark. 173 , 90 S.W.2d 476 (1936). The second principle is that once we have construed a statute, our interpretation becomes part of the act just as if it had been so written by the legislature. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61 , 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993); Gibson v. Gibson, 264 S.W.2d 418 , 572 S.W.2d 146 (1978); E.C. Barton v. Neal, 263 Ark. 40 , 562 S.W.2d 294 (1978); Merchant’s Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Gates, 180 Ark. 96 , 21 S.W.2d 406 (1929).
Adhering to these two principles, we have, on many occasions, refused to abandon our interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision in the absence of legislative action. See, e.g., Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421 , 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997) (thirty-six-year interpretation of the habeas corpus act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103 ); Morris v. McLemore, supra (one hundred-year interpretation of the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 ); Burns v. Burns, supra, (seven-year interpretation of the marital property act, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315 ); Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enters., 306 Ark. 461 , 816 S.W.2d 164 (1991) (fifty-year construction of the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711 ); Southwest Ark. Communications, Inc. v. Arrington, supra (five-year interpretation of the usury law contained in Ark. Const., amend. 60); E.C. Lumber Co. v. Neal & Jones, supra (seventy-year construction of the mechanic’s lien statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 51-601); Gibson v. Gibson, supra (sixteen-year interpretation of the partition statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1801).
Eleven years ago, we held in Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 528 , 715 S.W.2d 432 (1986), and McCarver v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 509 , 715 S.W.2d 429 (1986), that pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-525 , the Second Injury Fund is not liable when an employee sustains successive injuries while working for the same employer. As mentioned previously, once we reached this conclusion, our interpretation became part of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Since that time, the General Assembly has convened on eight separate occasions, 1 but no changes were made to Section 11-9-525 in response to our holdings in Riceland and McCarver. In fact, in 1993, the General Assembly made comprehensive revisions to the Workers Compensation Act, some of which were in response to particular cases decided by this court. 1993 Ark. Acts 796 , §§ 6 2 and 31. 3 Yet, Section 11-9-525, and our interpretation thereof, remained unchanged.
Even though the legislature has, by implication, approved of our holdings in Riceland and McCarver, the majority is willing to abandon our well-established precedent in favor of the policy considerations articulated by Timberline. Although these policy considerations appear persuasive, the identical arguments were considered and rejected by this court eleven years ago in Riceland and McCarver. In particular, the majority appears to have been persuaded by Timberline’s contention that our construction of Section 11-9-525 discourages employers from retaining impaired or injured workers. However, the record before us is devoid of any evidence indicating that this concern has been realized over the last eleven years. In the absence of such evidence, I am hesitant to abandon our well-established interpretation of Section 11-9-525.
Finally, as we said in Gibson v. Gibson, “even though we might feel that decision was wrong in retrospect, the construction of the statute . . . established a rule of [law], and we are not at liberty to overturn it.” Once we considered the relevant policy considerations and interpreted the ambiguous language contained in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-525 , our construction became part of the statute itself, and it was up to the legislature to amend the act if it disagreed with our interpretation. The General Assembly has simply refused to do so, and we should not act in their stead.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Corbin, J., joins in this dissent. Regular Sessions in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995 and Extraordinary Sessions in 1988, 1989, 1992.
Specifically rejecting our interpretations of the exclusive remedy provision, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 , in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239 , 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198 , 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); and Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228 , 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).
Specifically rejecting our construction of the provision regarding the modification of-workers’ compensation awards, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-713 , in International Paper Co. v. Tuberville, 302 Ark. 22 , 786 S.W.2d 830 (1990).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9765133. Public record. Not legal advice.