# In Re Braig

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · April 29, 1991 · 527 Pa. 248

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9764676

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re Joseph P. BRAIG, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 29, 1991
- **Citations:** 527 Pa. 248; 590 A.2d 284; 1991 Pa. LEXIS 99
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Flaherty
- **Judges:** Nix, Flaherty, Zappala, Papadakos, Cappy, McDermott
- **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9764676

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that, under the Shaver rule, bribery is only infamous if its purpose is to obstruct justice

## Opinion text

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Anyone holding judicial office who is convicted of a crime which is malum in se or crimen falsi as opposed to one which is merely malum prohibitum should be regarded as having been convicted of “misbehavior in office” for purposes of forfeiture of judicial office pursuant to Art. 5, § 18(Z) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Historical distinctions between these types of crimes underlie the differentiation between automatic forfeiture of judicial office under Art. 5, § 18(Z), clause 1 (conviction of misbehav *260 ior in office) and removal under Art. 5, § 18(i), clause 3 (removal following formal charges, investigation by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, and action by this Court).
Although the Crimes Code contains no crime denominated “misbehavior in office,” the Constitution’s reference to such a crime as a basis for forfeiture should be construed in accordance with the obvious purpose of the provision, to wit, to remove from judicial office anyone whose criminal record would serve to seriously undermine public confidence in and respect for the courts. The fact that a crime was unrelated to the official duties of a judge is not pivotal, for the Constitutional provision does not refer to “misbehavior in the performance of official duties.” Rather, it merely refers to “misbehavior in office,” which, in view of the purpose of the provision, should be construed to mean “misbehavior while in office.” Allowing persons convicted of serious crimes which are malum in se or crimen falsi to continue in office to administer justice to others, and to serve as purported pillars of respect for the legal system, is nothing less than farcical.
I would hold, therefore, that Judge Braig’s conviction of mail fraud provides a basis for automatic forfeiture of his judicial office.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9764676. Public record. Not legal advice.