# Su Inn Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington

> Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo) · November 4, 1998 · 984 S.W.2d 672

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9764004

## Case

- **Full name:** Su Inn HO, Appellant, v. the UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON, Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
- **Decided:** November 4, 1998
- **Citations:** 984 S.W.2d 672; 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 6909; 1998 WL 767095
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Quinn
- **Judges:** Boyd, Dodson, Quinn
- **Cited by:** 164 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9764004

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that terms of judgment disposing of all parties and claims necessarily vacates prior inconsistent interlocutory order, even though trial court did not refer to prior order or expressly state an intention to vacate the prior order in second judgment
- holding that the proper characterization of the plaintiffs complaint is formed by “determining the makeup of the remedy sought and by assessing which action, with due regard to the defendants rights, that would most amply redress the plaintiff’
- explaining that a duty to speak may exist when the parties are in a fiduciary relationship or when a party later discovers that a material representation it made was untrue
- noting that substantive component of due course of law guarantee protects citizens from state action that arbitrarily or capriciously deprives them of interest in life, liberty, or property
- holding that trial court has broad discretionary power and inherent authority to control its own docket

## Opinion text

QUINN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent insofar as the majority finds a four-year statute of limitations applicable to Ho’s causes of action emanating from the equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. I agree that the applicable limitations period must be determined by looking “to the substance of the plaintiffs pleadings to characterize the nature of his grievance.” However, I differ with the conclusion that the limitations period applicable to the equal protection claims alleged here differs from that applicable to equal protection claims asserted via United States Code title 42, section 1983.
*695 Ho claims that her right to equal protection of law under article 1, section 3 of the Texas Constitution was violated because she suffered gender discrimination and a deprivation of property rights. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 , 105 S.Ct. 1938 , 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Court held that suits stemming from section 1983 are “personal injury” actions for pui'poses of determining limitations. The majority finds the reasoning of Wilson inapplicable because Wilson involved a statutory remedy whereas the present case does not. Since the only relief available for Ho’s equal protection claim is injunctive, it concludes that the claim does not sound in personal injury. Thus, the four-year residual limitation period applies, Tex. Crv. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997), in its estimation. With this, I respectfully disagree.
The Wilson court found a section 1983 violation akin to a personal injury not because of the nature of the remedy available nor because the claim was statutory. Rather, it focused upon the nature of the injury suffered. Because the rights enforceable under section 1983, specifically those of due process and equal protection, “are among the rights possessed by every individual in a civilized society,” 471 U.S. at 278-79 , 105 S.Ct. at 1948 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 268 , their violation “is an injury to the individual rights of the person.” 471 U.S. at 277 , 105 S.Ct. at 1948 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 267 . In other words, section 1983 does not create the right involved, but merely provides for a remedy. And, when invoked in relation to violations of constitutional rights, the remedy serves to ameliorate injuries to “ ‘rights which emanate from or are guaranteed to the person.’ ” Id. (quoting Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (1972)) (emphasis added). Thus, violations of constitutional rights are nothing short of personal injuries, according to Wilson. Id.
Admittedly, the equal protection right invoked at bar arises under the Texas, as opposed to the United States, Constitution. Nevertheless, the purpose underlying article 1, section 3 of our Constitution is no different than that of its federal cousin. See Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex.1990) (stating that the interpretation of article 1, section 3 of the Texas Constitution echoes that of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution). Both exist to protect rights guaranteed to the person. Thus, I find the rationale and result of Wilson persuasive here and conclude that a violation of either constitutional mandate is an injury to the person. Being an injury to the person, the limitations period would be two years as set forth in section 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Since Su Inn Ho did not act within that period, I would hold that summary judgment was appropriate viz her equal protection claim.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9764004. Public record. Not legal advice.