# District of Columbia v. Patterson

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · November 30, 1995 · 667 A.2d 1338

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9763190

## Case

- **Full name:** DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Terrie PATTERSON, Et Al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** November 30, 1995
- **Citations:** 667 A.2d 1338; 1995 D.C. App. LEXIS 244; 1995 WL 702619
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Wagner
- **Judges:** Wagner, Terry, Steadman
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9763190

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reversing an attorneys’ fees award in a case involving a contingency-fee arrangement, but nowhere indicating that a fees award is inappropriate in a contingency-fee case
- declining to consider an argument that the plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise but failed to raise in their fee petition in the trial court

## Opinion text

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, plaintiff succeeded on a “ ‘significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit [she] sought in bringing suit;”’ therefore, she is a prevailing party within the meaning of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641 , 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and may be awarded attorney fees thereunder. Texas Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 , 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493 , 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)); accord, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 , 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). There is no disagreement among the panel about the general rule which governs whether a party is entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988. What seems to divide us is the difficult problem of determining when a party fairly may be said to have prevailed on a claim for declaratory judgment for purposes of shifting counsel fees to the opposing party under the controlling precedents. Although this is a close question, plaintiffs crossed that threshold, in my opinion.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to a prompt hearing to establish probable cause for the seizure of her property, among other things, when the government takes it pursuant to D.C.Code § 33-552 (1988). 1 The trial court observed that from the time of the seizure until the filing of a libel under § 33-552, “there was no reasonably accessible procedure for protecting against unreasonable seizures.” Not until after plaintiffs had filed these actions did the government initiate proceedings under § 33-552. The government took the position that plaintiff was afforded adequate protection by the opportunity for a hearing once it initiated a libel, which could be brought within a one-year statute of limitations period. 2 The trial court determined that “some method must be provided for determining whether probable cause exists to retain property during a period when there is otherwise no involvement by any court.” The court ruled that
any particular seizure and detention of property are subject to the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness as determined in a nonadversary judicial review. A warrant need not be obtained prior to the seizure of property, but at a minimum, claimants from whom property has been seized have a right to a probable cause determination, postseizure at their request.
Pursuant to the court’s ruling, Patterson requested and obtained such a hearing.
On these facts, plaintiff should be considered a prevailing party for attorney fee pur *1349 poses. Plaintiff obtained some of the relief she sought, specifically, a post-seizure probable cause hearing where such a remedy previously had not been recognized. Unlike the party in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 , 107 S.Ct. 2672 , 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987), where prevailing party status was rejected, plaintiff successfully pursued declaratory judgment relief which required the government to make an immediate showing of probable cause instead of awaiting the outcome of the libel action which it filed. 3 In my view, the trial court’s ruling on the request for declaratory judgment was more than a mere interlocutory ruling on a pendente lite motion respecting whether a party has stated a constitutional claim, which has been rejected as a basis for recovery of attorney fees under § 1988. See id. at 760, 107 S.Ct. at 2675 . Not only did plaintiff state a constitutional claim, but she was successful in having it disposed of in her favor. The fact that she did not ultimately prevail on her request for return of the car is not dispositive. Such a requirement would seem to sanction the “central issue test” which the Supreme Court rejected in Texas Teachers Ass’n, supra, 489 U.S. at 792 , 109 S.Ct. at 1493 . In Texas Teachers Ass’n, the Court pointed out that “the degree of the plaintiffs success in relation to the other goals of the lawsuit is a factor critical to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee, not to eligibility for a fee award at all.” Id. at 790 , 109 S.Ct. at 1492 . Pertinent to our review, the court describes a prevailing party as “one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendente lite or at the conclusion of the litigation.” 4 Id at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1493 . In light of the recognition that pendente lite relief may form a basis for an award of attorney fees under § 1988, I cannot agree with the majority that in order to recover, the favorable ruling must “effect a future course of conduct toward the plaintiff apart from the litigation itself.” (Emphasis added.)
In this case, there was a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties as a result of the disposition of the declaratory action which entitles plaintiff to prevailing party status. Absent that declaration, the government was at liberty to simply retain appellant’s property without any showing of probable cause and to defer any opportunity for the asserted innocent owner to challenge its claim until such time as it chose to file the libel and have the matter litigated. In securing the right to a post-seizure hearing by way of declaratory judgment, plaintiff “ ‘succeeded] on [a] significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit [she] sought in bringing suit.’ ” See Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 433 , 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (quoting Nadeau, supra, 581 F.2d at 278-79 ). For these reasons, in my opinion, she is a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. Plaintiff Patterson's automobile was seized when a man to whom she had loaned it was arrested on drug charges. The owner claimed a lack of knowledge or involvement in any crime. See D.C.Code § 33-552(a)(4)(B) (property exempt from forfeiture where illicit use is without owner’s knowledge or consent).
. This court has held that the one year statute of limitations under D.C.Code § 12-305(5) (1995) for libel actions for forfeiture under § 22-1505(c) (1989) is tolled "during the time period between seizure of the property and judgment in the underlying criminal prosecution.” Ward v. District of Columbia, 494 A.2d 666, 670 (D.C.1985). Assuming application of this tolling rule to seizures under § 33-552, such a period portends an inordinately lengthy delay without any hearing for any innocent owner whose vehicle is seized.
. It is not clear from the record whether the government filed the libel in response to plaintiff's lawsuit, although the libel was the later-filed action. Such circumstances may form the basis for finding a plaintiff to be a prevailing parly. See Hewitt, supra, 482 U.S. at 761 , 107 S.Ct. at 2676 . In Hewitt , the Supreme Court stated "in a declaratoiy judgment action: if the defendant, under pressure of the lawsuit, alters his conduct (or threatened conduct) towards the plaintiff that was the basis for the suit, the plaintiff will have prevailed.” Id. Here, absent plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment and for a post-seizure probable cause hearing, the government could have retained plaintiff's property for several years without any showing of probable cause to entitlement or any opportunity for challenge until the libel action was heard.
. It does not appear that the Supreme Court in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), in reviewing its prior opinions, sought to effect any change in its precedents defining prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney fees under § 1988. In Farrar , the issue before the Court was whether a plaintiff who wins damages in a suit for violation of his civil rights was a prevailing party for purposes of § 1988. The Court held he was because "[a] judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatoiy or nominal, modifies the defendant’s behavior for the plaintiff's benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay.” Id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. at 574 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9763190. Public record. Not legal advice.