# Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · January 24, 1986 · 350 Pa. Super. 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762811

## Case

- **Full name:** George HATCHARD and Mt. Pocono AMC/Jeep, Inc. v. WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING COMPANY and KYW-TV 3, Appellants; Zigmond LEFKOSKI, Jr. v. NEP COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Appeal of NEP COMMUNICATIONS, INC., T/D/B/A WNEP-TV News
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 24, 1986
- **Citations:** 350 Pa. Super. 1; 504 A.2d 211; 1986 Pa. Super. LEXIS 9276
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Wieand
- **Judges:** Spaeth, Wickersham, Brosky, Rowley, Wieand, Cirillo, Olszewski, Beck, Tamilia
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762811

## Opinion text

WIEAND, Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would limit the holding in In Re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32 , 193 A.2d 181 (1963), to the facts there before the Court and thus distinguish it from the facts of the instant case. The majority has made a good case for doing so; and, therefore, it is unnecessary to repeat the reasons here. It may be observed, however, that the same limitation upon Taylor has already been suggested by the Supreme Court when, in Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304 , 485 A.2d 374 (1984), it said that the Pennsylvania Shield Law “was never intended to be interpreted as insulating the publisher from its negligence or actual malice.” Id., 506 Pa. at 328 n. 14, 485 A.2d at 387 n. 14.
The broad interpretation placed upon Taylor by the majority must inevitably permit the media to suppress at will any and all “information” gathered but not published. Not only is such a result unwise — as the majority concedes — but it clearly was not intended by the legislature, whose sole purpose in enacting the Pennsylvania Shield Law was to protect the media against being required “to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 5942(a) (emphasis added).
I would affirm the order entered by Judge Greenberg in the Hatchard case. In the Lefkoski case, I would modify *56 the order to protect against the disclosure of appellant’s “sources” and, as so modified, would affirm the order of Judge Brominski.
ROWLEY, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762811. Public record. Not legal advice.