# Studer v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · November 21, 1990 · 799 S.W.2d 263

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762490

## Case

- **Full name:** Jimmy Randolph STUDER, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** November 21, 1990
- **Citations:** 799 S.W.2d 263; 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 190; 1990 WL 180802
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Teague
- **Judges:** Miller, Teague, McCormick
- **Cited by:** 430 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762490

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating, "In sum, the wording of Article V, § 12(b), that provides 'an indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury charging a person with the commission of an offense; an information is a written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for th…
- holding that a charging instrument may be an indictment as contemplated by the Texas constitution even if fails to charge each element of an offense

## Opinion text

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring.
Because my vote to join the majority opinion by Judge Miller might be misconstrued in some quarters, I write this short concurring opinion.
My understanding of the majority opinion, as far as the State pleading an offense against the accused since Art. V, § 12, Texas Constitution, was amended, is that it is now permissible for the State to plead “bare-bones.” For example, in charging the offense of murder, it is now necessary for the State only to plead the conclusion that the accused committed the offense of murder in such and such county on such and such date, without alleging any facts regarding the murder. Although I cannot imagine any prosecuting attorney of this State willing to plead “bare-bones,” that is the perogative of the prosecuting attorneys of this State. However, I cannot imagine any competent defense attorney not filing a motion to quash the indictment in that instance. Thus, it appears to me that, if anything, the Constitutional Amendment will, from a practical standpoint, cause more work to be hoisted on our now overworked trial judges, if prosecuting attorneys plead “bare-bones.” I would suggest to prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, and trial judges, that if the State desires to plead “bare-bones,” and the de *301 fendant and his attorney are going to enter into a plea bargain ■ agreement, which agreement is going to be accepted by the trial judge, that the indictment be replaced with an information, and then the indictment be dismissed on motion of the State.
With these brief remarks, I join the majority opinion by Judge MILLER.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762490. Public record. Not legal advice.