# Stebbing v. State

> Court of Appeals of Maryland · April 16, 1984 · 299 Md. 331

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762137

## Case

- **Full name:** Annette Louise STEBBING v. STATE of Maryland
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland
- **Decided:** April 16, 1984
- **Citations:** 299 Md. 331; 473 A.2d 903; 1984 Md. LEXIS 267
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Davidson
- **Judges:** Rodowsky, Eldridge, Davidson
- **Cited by:** 84 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762137

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that an individual who drives a getaway car and waits outside a convenience store while the perpetrator robs the store, is guilty as a principal in the second degree of robbery and the person who actually robbed the store is guilty as a principal in the first degree…
- affirming death sentence and finding that sentencing authority was not required to find statutory mitigating circumstances despite defendant's age at time of crime (19), extensive proof of defendant's history of substance abuse, mental illness and other cognitive impairment, a…
- holding that the taking of property still constituted a robbery even though the original attack may not have been committed for the purpose of taking the victim’s property
- holding that taking and asportation of property constitutes robbery even where intent to steal is not formed until after application of force resulting in death

## Opinion text

DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I adhere to my view expressed in my dissenting opinion in Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 485-94, 501-02 , 468 A.2d 1, *391 26-31, 34-35 (1983) (Davidson, J., dissenting) (Tichnell III) that the legislative history and legislative purpose of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 414(e)(4) require the term “similar cases” to be construed to include not only those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty whether it was imposed or not, but also those other death eligible murder cases in which the prosecutor could have but did not seek the death penalty. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion upholding the imposition of the death penalty. I would vacate the death sentence and remand for the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762137. Public record. Not legal advice.