# Copeland v. Boone

> Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · September 8, 1993 · 866 S.W.2d 55

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762067

## Case

- **Full name:** Harlon COPELAND, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff and Nancy Baeza, Individually & in Her Official Capacity as Bexar County Sheriffs Deputy, Appellants, v. Patricia Neef BOONE & Ronald W. Boone, Appellees
- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)
- **Decided:** September 8, 1993
- **Citations:** 866 S.W.2d 55; 1993 WL 336047
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Butts
- **Judges:** Butts, Rickhoff, Dial
- **Cited by:** 15 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762067

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that state law enforcement officers entitled to official immunity for discretionary acts performed in good faith and in the scope of their employment
- describing circumstances in Dent v. City of Dallas that demonstrated discretionary act
- noting Act’s retention of employees’ common-law official immunity

## Opinion text

BUTTS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the affidavit of officer Baeza does not support the defense of qualified immunity. The majority opinion is concerned only with a summary judgment which is based on the alleged qualified immunity. However, it is noteworthy that .the pleadings in the case and the motion for summary judgment touch on another defense: the ministerial duty of Baeza. Therefore, there is also a question whether the affidavit can be said to support the defense of official immunity based on performance of a ministerial duty. It is clear that Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993) does not limit the immunity defense in a summary judgment interlocutory appeal to “qualified” immunity only; it includes any official immunity.
Although the general rule is that a public officer may not be liable for damages in the performance of a purely ministerial duty, a recognized exception is when there is negligent performance of a ministerial duty. Under the facts of this case, while the defense of ministerial duty may have been presented, the trial judge properly could have rejected *59 this immunity defense in the face of a negligence question. Those matters may be determined at trial.
In addition, since this interlocutory appeal is permitted only by a statute which strictly curtails jurisdiction, the “notice” question raised by the pleadings cannot be considered by the appellate court. Therefore, I concur in the affirmance.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9762067. Public record. Not legal advice.