# State Ex Rel. Eidson v. Edwards

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 27, 1990 · 793 S.W.2d 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9761546

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Texas Ex Rel. James EIDSON v. Hon. Billy John EDWARDS, Judge, 104th Judicial District of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** June 27, 1990
- **Citations:** 793 S.W.2d 1; 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 131; 1990 WL 87314
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Berchelmann
- **Judges:** Berchelmann, Clinton, Miller, Sturns, Teague, White
- **Cited by:** 137 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9761546

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the trial court erred in entering an order disqualifying the Taylor County Criminal District Attorney (and his entire staff) when it disqualified one prosecutor who had previously represented a defendant in the same criminal matter
- concluding error occurred where the trial judge’s order disqualified the district attorney because prior defense counsel became an assistant prosecutor and the trial court sought to avoid the appearance of impropriety
- stating that "[a] trial court judge is without legal authority to remove a District Attorney from a case and, as such, any order attempting to do so is void."
- discussing the distinction between legal disqualification and voluntary recusal for a possible conflict of interest to avoid the appearance of impropriety
- stating that violation of due process caused by prosecutor's failure to recuse requires reversal on appeal

## Opinion text

BERCHELMANN, Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the majority’s opinion, I write this brief concurring opinion to express my concerns with the unnecessarily broad language employed therein. I do not agree that a trial court’s removal of a District Attorney’s Office on a particular case is tantamount to removing the District Attorney from his elected office. “Removing” a county official from office is a term of art, and this drastic action is limited to the three narrow situations involving a county official’s incompetence, official misconduct or intoxication. V.T.C.A., Local Gov’t.Code Sec. 87.018(a).
Removing a District Attorney’s Office from a particular case, however, is clearly distinct from an attempt to remove an official from his or her elected office. Because the majority’s opinion on motion for rehearing is premised on that fundamental misconception, I concur only in the result reached.
CLINTON, MILLER and STURNS, JJ., join this opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9761546. Public record. Not legal advice.