# Humason v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · March 18, 1987 · 728 S.W.2d 363

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9760554

## Case

- **Full name:** Paul Allan HUMASON, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** March 18, 1987
- **Citations:** 728 S.W.2d 363; 1987 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 548
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Clinton
- **Judges:** Campbell, Clinton, Davis, Onion, McCormick, White
- **Cited by:** 275 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (1991).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 1
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9760554

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had knowledge that the substance found in an unzipped bag was narcotics

## Opinion text

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Once again we confront “the unique character of ‘possessory’ offenses [that] has always plagued and confounded the bench and bar.” Gorman v. State, 634 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). In addressing the offense at issue in this cause from the standpoint of the culpable mental state of “knowingly,” the opinion of the Court first succumbs to the temptation to revisit past definitions of “possession,” and as I understand note 7, the Court is holding that the statutory definition in Article 4476-15, § 1.02(34) V.A.C.S., prevails over former loose usage in the cases. So far so good.
According to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Titles 1, 2, and 3 apply to “offenses defined by other laws.” The same definition of possession is in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.07(a)(28). But that definition alone *368 does not provide a full meaning of the term; also to be considered are provisions in Title 1, Chapter 6, § 6.01(a) and (b), alluded to at page 4, but not discussed, in the opinion of the Court. I write to point out there is more to the meaning of “possession” than the statutory definition.
The sine qua non for an offense is that a person “voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession, § 6.01(a). And “as the words ‘actual care, custody, control or management,’ indicate, the voluntary act of ‘possession’ necessarily presupposes that ‘the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.’ V.T.C.A. Penal Code, 6.01(b). Thus myriad possession cases allude to the quite distinct requirement that the actor ‘know of the whereabouts of the contraband.’ In sum, an awareness of the whereabouts of the contraband is an essential ingredient of the culpable act of ‘possession;’ that is, the state of having ‘care,’ ‘control,’ ‘management’ or ‘custody’ under our law.” Gor-man v. State, supra, at 686. *
This novel character of “possession” is distinct from yet must be coupled with the required “culpable mental state” that the actor know the forbidden nature of the object or substance that is in his actual care, custody, control or management to constitute an offense. Gorman, supra, notes 6 and 7. In this cause, the applicable element of “knowingly” in § 6.03(b) is that the actor be “aware of the nature of his conduct.”
As thus analyzed, that appellant is not shown by the evidence to “possess” the residue of white powder in a vial in an unzipped cloth gym bag on, as the majority below found, the passenger’s seat is clear enough to me. And on that basis I join the opinion of the Court.
Emphasis added in original; all other emphasis is mine unless otherwise indicated.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9760554. Public record. Not legal advice.