# Vicknair v. State > Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · April 18, 1984 · 670 S.W.2d 286 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9759851 ## Case - **Full name:** James Wallace VICKNAIR, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee - **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) - **Decided:** April 18, 1984 - **Citations:** 670 S.W.2d 286 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Doyle - **Judges:** Evans, Cohen, Doyle - **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9759851 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that Texas’s tail lamp statute, which required a tail lamp to emit “a red light plainly visible from a distance of 1000 feet to the rear,” was not violated when the tail lamp had a cracked lens and white light shined through the crack because no evidence established… ## Opinion text DOYLE, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion is predicated on the premise that there was no basis to justify the original detention, and hence the war-rantless arrest and search were illegal. Therefore, it reasons, any evidence obtained as a result of such a search was illegally seized and should have been suppressed. I shall first discuss the original detention. Was there probable cause to stop and arrest the appellant? In the instant ease, the fact that the taillight was broken and emitting a red and white light is undisputed. Therefore, the appellant’s motion to suppress raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to *289 support a warrantless arrest as a matter of law. Killingsworth v. State, 306 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Cr.App.1957). It thus became the duty of the trial judge to rule on the admission of the evidence and this ruling will not be disturbed if there is any basis to support it. Fowler v. State, 379 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.Cr.App.1964). The trial judge had before him the testimony of Officer Illing-worth to the effect that he had been trained and instructed to issue citation to drivers who operated vehicles with taillights cracked or defective to the extent that they emitted white light coming through the rear. Contrary to the statement in appellant’s brief to the effect that the only reference to the time of day was that it was “evening”, the trial court heard testimony that also revealed that the time was “night”. When Officer Illingworth was asked to identify a defense exhibit showing the subject car, he stated: Q. Let me show you what is been marked Defense Exhibit No. 1. Can you identify that? A. Yes, sir, that the ... I believe that to be the vehicle we stopped that night. Later, on being questioned about the appearance of the car, the officer testified: Q. Does it appear to be the same as it did on or about November 27th of 1981, Officer? A. From my memory, I couldn’t tell if that’s the exact same taillight that was on it that night. Q. What taillight lens was out then, right or left? A. Right side. (Emphasis added) In response to further questioning by defense counsel the officer responded: Q. And what was that violation? A. Cracked taillight lens. Q. And that is a violation of what law? A. I believe Vernon’s Civil Statutes of Texas Moving Motor Vehicle Laws. * # * * * * Q. Is that why you’re talking about, not having a taillight that emits something red? A. What I am referring to sir, is a taillight lens that has been cracked to the extent you could observe white light coming through the rear. Q. That is a violation of the law? A. Yes. I was instructed by the department and in my training to issue a citation for that particular violation. From such testimony I feel that the trial judge was fully justified in concluding that Officer Illingworth had probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had been committed. This was all that was necessary to support or authorize the original stop and detention as the hereinafter cited case will show. Whether a prosecution for the defective taillight violation would fail or succeed need not be considered by this court in its determination of whether the search and seizure was lawful. The facts in Soileau v. State, 244 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Cr.App.1951) are similar to those in the case here considered. Houston police on patrol at 3:30 o’clock a.m. saw the defendant Soileau drive through a red light. They pursued and arrested him for the traffic violation and while searching his person found a pistol. He was tried and convicted for unlawfully carrying a pistol. In affirming the conviction, Judge Davidson stated: We are not here dealing with the question of whether appellant was in fact guilty of such violation; all the requirement necessary for the officers to make the arrest was the existence of probable cause authorizing the belief that the traffic offense had been committed. According to the undisputed testimony, the patrolmen were authorized to so conclude and therefore to make the arrest. Thus, on this appeal, we are concerned with whether Officer Illingworth had before him, at the time of the incident, facts and circumstances within his knowledge that would reasonably justify his belief that an offense had been committed in violation of § 111 of art. 6701d. Praska v. State, 557 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 , 80 S.Ct. 168 , 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Beck v. *290 Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 , 85 S.Ct. 223 , 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Although in Henry and Beck , the Supreme Court found no probable cause for the arrests therein involved, these cases succinctly point out the circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest. In Praska , the officer observed what he considered to be an illegal left turn by a motorist from an Austin public street. The officer did not see the motorist give any signal as required by article 6701d, § 68(a). After stopping the vehicle, a search of it led to the recovery of a contraband drug and the defendant was charged with its possession. The disposition of that case (as does ours) hinged on a single issue. Was the officer justified in stopping the defendant? In upholding the defendant’s conviction in Praska on the basis that there was probable cause for the initial stopping of the defendant and hence the admission of the fruits of the resulting search, Judge Onion reasoned as follows: It is significant that the record in the instant case reflects the following testimony by Officer Evans: Q. In your own mind did you believe that the defendant had committed a traffic violation? A. Yes, sir, that’s why I went after him. Q. That’s why you pulled the car over? A. Yes. The facts in the instant case were sufficient observable facts by Officer Evans to reasonably justify said belief and thus afford him probable cause for the stopping of appellant. The appellant and the majority rely on Willett v. State, 454 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) and Hall v. State, 488 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) to support their contention that the detention and arrest in the case before us were illegal. Both of these cases are clearly distinguishable. From the officers’ testimony in each case, it was established that no traffic violation had occurred in violation of art. 6701d, § 68(a), nor was there any testimony showing any other reason for stopping the defendants. Their testimony clearly showed that they had no reason, nor believed that they had a reason to stop the defendants. I think these cases were correctly decided on their facts. In our case the testimony is to the effect that the officer saw a defective taillight and believed that it was his duty to stop the appellant and issue a citation for it. This satisfies all of the state and federal requirements of probable cause as set forth in the case law and constitutions. The majority ruling would require every law enforcement officer to be legally correct in his appraisal of every situation which he deems to be a violation of the law before he makes a warrantless arrest. The fact that he had a bona fide, reasonable and earnest belief that he was witnessing a crime or violation of the law would not give rise to probable cause under the majority’s holding. This is simply not the law. If the testimony of Officer Illingworth is analyzed in its entirety, I believe a violation of § 111 is clearly shown. The officer testified as follows: Q. Was the red light illuminating from the taillight? A. I would say yes. There was a red light, but it was a portion of it that had white light as well. Section 111 makes no mention whatsoever about the taillamps emitting “a white light plainly visible...” It mentions only a red light. Would a green, pink, blue, white or any other color or combination of colors showing forth from the taillamps satisfy the requirement of the statute? I believe that a taillight that emits both a red light and a white light is violative of the exclusionary wording of § 111. I would congratulate the officer for doing what he perceived to be his duty. I would overrule the appellant’s motion to suppress and sustain the trial court’s judgment. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9759851. Public record. Not legal advice.