# Grunsfeld v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · October 28, 1992 · 843 S.W.2d 521

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9759611

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert Charles GRUNSFELD, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee; Jerred J. HUNTER, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** October 28, 1992
- **Citations:** 843 S.W.2d 521; 1992 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 201; 1992 WL 308901
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by White
- **Judges:** Maloney, Clinton, McCormick, Campbell, White, Benavides, Miller, Maloney'S, Clinton'S
- **Cited by:** 224 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Flores v. State, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (1994).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9759611

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the legislature's use of the term "including" in amending Article 37.07(3)(a) rendered the list following it nonexclusive
- holding that it was reversible error to admit unadjudicated extraneous offense evidence at the punishment phase of a non-capital trial
- holding a running objection preserved error when the trial court stated expressly that no further objection needed to be made
- holding that 1989 amendments did not expand the statute to include the admission of unadjudicated extraneous offenses
- Discussing the addition of the word “including” in TexCode Crim.ProcAnn. art. 37.07(3)(a)

## Opinion text

WHITE, Judge,
dissenting.
Today, the aggressive and assertive plurality of this Court, unsatisfied with our Legislature’s decision to permit the juries of this state to receive relevant, realistic and accurate descriptions of the character and past history of convicted defendants so that the juries may fairly assess sentences, relies upon its misperception of the authority of its electoral mandate to foist upon the juries of this State its own judicially legislated changes to TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. ANN.Art. 37.07, § 3(a). I vigorously dissent, and agree with Presiding Judge McCormick and Judge Campbell’s views criticizing the plurality’s attempt to interpret the legislative intent behind the 1989 ■changes to Art. 37.07 § 3(a). I also agree with Judge Benavides’ views concerning the interpretation of the language of the amendments to Art. 37.07 § 3(a).
In my view, the decision of the plurality reflects a basic and cynical mistrust of the average citizen’s ability to fairly and impartially assess the appropriate punishment for a person convicted of a crime. I can find no other explanation for the plurality’s decision to blithely overturn the legislative changes to Art. 37.07 § 3(a) and place juries back in the position they were in after this Court’s prior decision in Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, at 56-68 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). In my dissent to that opinion, I explained my position concerning a jury’s need for all relevant information when deciding whether or not to probate the sentence of a defendant.
“Juries comprised of law abiding citizens of the community in which the defendant, if given probation, will reside, are vested with the discretion to assess a fair and appropriate sentence. In their determination of the appropriateness of probation, they are entitled to know the defendant’s criminal history, just as the judge is provided in a pre-sentence report when he considers the same. See, Art. 42.12, § 4. There is nothing to show that a jury cannot be as fair and impartial as a judge or that the prior criminal history is not as every bit important to the juries’ common sense determination of the issues.”
Murphy v. State, 111 S.W.2d, at 53. See, also, Murphy v. State, at 73. Under the authority of the new Art. 37.07 § 3(a), I believe that juries are entitled during the punishment stage of a trial to hear a complete description of the relevant criminal history of a defendant in all cases, whether a defendant is eligible for probation or not.
To the extent that the plurality is uncomfortable with the prospect of a jury being permitted to hear the whole truth about a convicted defendant, they can take comfort in the fact that the Legislature, in its wisdom, did not permit the trial courts of this State unbridled discretion in what those courts may choose to allow to be admitted into evidence during the punishment phase of a trial. Before admitting the evidence, the trial court must first be satisfied that the proffered evidence is relevant to a material fact in issue. Art. 37.07 § 3(a) sets out:
“evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter *565 the court deems relevant to sentencing,
Pursuant to the requirements of the statute, a trial court must first be satisfied that the proffered evidence passes muster under TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. Rule 401. 1 If the trial court finds the proffered evidence to be relevant, it must then determine under TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. Rule 403 if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. These requirements sufficed to protect the defendant in Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, at 386-390 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), if not at trial, then on appellate review of the trial court’s decision. Montgomery v. State, supra, at 390-397. This would be sufficient for any defendant, provided that trial counsel has insured that error has been preserved.
It is difficult to imagine how the Legislature can successfully amend Art. 37.07 § 3(a) in order to convince the aggressive and assertive plurality of this Court that they intend for a jury to be permitted to review relevant unadjudicated criminal actions of a defendant during the assessment of punishment for a non-capital crime. Perhaps they will print the amendatory language in extra-large bold type, not unlike that of a grade school primer. Or perhaps they will, somehow, be able to find more direct language to use, much like a farmer would use a two-by-four across the nose of a recalcitrant mule in order to convince it that it is time to get off its hind quarter and pull the wagon. Whatever method the Legislature selects, it will be interesting, to say the least, to witness how the aggressive and assertive members of this Court rewrites it.
This is another attempt to prevent law abiding citizens of Texas (juries) from meting out proper punishment to those criminals who rape, rob and murder their children and their families.
I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in Grunsfeld, remanding for consideration of points of error not reached on original submission, and affirm the Court of Appeals decision in Hunter. To the decision of the plurality to do otherwise, I dissent.
. Rule 401 reads as follows:
Definition of "Relevant Evidence” “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination" of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9759611. Public record. Not legal advice.
