# Commonwealth v. Bricker > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · February 13, 1985 · 506 Pa. 571 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9758760 ## Case - **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Robert BRICKER, Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** February 13, 1985 - **Citations:** 506 Pa. 571; 487 A.2d 346; 1985 Pa. LEXIS 296 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Flaherty - **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos - **Cited by:** 35 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9758760 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “remarks implying that the defense used its right of discovery to present false testimony” had violated “the rules … that a prosecutor must limit statements to facts in evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom and must not express personal opinions on guilt, c… - finding counsel ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor’s improper closing argument ## Opinion text FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. The opinion authored by Mr. Justice Zappala construes as conduct warranting a new trial actions of the prosecutor which did not rise to the level of misconduct that would have significantly undermined the fairness of appellant’s trial. The prosecutor’s cross-examination of defense witness Bonasorte, whereby an inference was created that Bonasorte was involved with an illegal drug business, was not sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. Further, the prosecutor’s expression, “That’s a lie,” made to Bonasorte during a portion of the cross-examination, was shown by the record to have been issued in an interrogatory manner, rather than in a declaratory fashion; thus, it did not constitute a seriously prejudicial expression of opinion as to the witness’ veracity. Similarly, the prosecutor’s comment that Bonasorte should look the jurors in the eye, because the jurors were staring at him, was not improper, under the circumstances, for the record reveals that the *591 comment was made in response to Bonasorte’s request, “I want to look at the jury.” There is no basis for the assertion that the prosecutor inferred that appellant had served time in prison for prior crimes. The prosecutor merely introduced evidence that one of the defense witnesses, Rossi, who had known appellant for 20 years, had been in prison for various periods during those 20 years. The mere fact that appellant knew someone who had been imprisoned is not evidence that appellant too had served time, and it is unreasonable to assume that only persons with records of criminal convictions could be acquainted with individuals who have served time in prison. Commonwealth witness Kellington testified that he did not warn Sacco of a plot against his life. Kellington stated that he was afraid to warn Sacco because of possible retribution from appellant, whom Kellington described as being a “coldblooded killer”. Kellington was, by this reference, merely explaining the basis for his fear, and without this reference Kellington’s explanation of the basis for his actions would have been an inadequate one. In closing argument, the prosecutor did not express an opinion that appellant was a “coldblooded killer,” but rather merely quoted testimony that had already been presented to the jury, which involved a relevant issue. The prosecutor, in closing, also called to the jury’s attention the fact that Bonasorte, upon leaving the witness stand, threatened the prosecutor. Since the record shows that the threat was in fact made, appellant was not unfairly prejudiced by the comment. Finally, the prosecutor’s comment upon defense witness Gabler’s testimony, whereby the prosecutor said, “He is the man who nailed the Commonwealth to the wall. Don’t let him do it,” was improper, but not sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of sentence. McDERMOTT and PAPADAKOS join this dissenting opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9758760. Public record. Not legal advice.