# Stryjewski v. Local Union No. 830 > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · September 26, 1967 · 426 Pa. 512 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9757887 ## Case - **Full name:** Stryjewski, Appellant, v. Local Union No. 830 - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** September 26, 1967 - **Citations:** 426 Pa. 512; 233 A.2d 264; 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321; 1967 Pa. LEXIS 600 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Bell - **Judges:** Bell, Cohen, Eagen, Jones, Musmanno, O'Brien, Roberts - **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9757887 ## Opinion text Dissenting Opinion bt Me. Chief Justice Bell: The Court has affirmed the refusal of the lower Court to grant a preliminary injunction because the case was “arguably” within the jurisdiction of the NLRB under San Diego Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 , 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959). I join in Justice Robeets’ dissenting Opinion, but I am impelled to make several additional observations. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C., §151 et seq., established a National policy, and where that was seriously affected gave NLRB exclusive jurisdiction. This was modified by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, §101, 29 U.S.C., §§152 (3) and 164. That Act (LMRA) provided that “the term ‘em *520 playee’ .... shall not include any individual . . . employed by his parent .-. -. :” Section 152(3), supra. * . Thereafter, and under the provisions of the LMRDA, Section'.164(c)(1).and (2), ** the NLRB announced in an-NLRB-. Release No. R-576 (issued October 2, 1958). that it would take jurisdiction (1) over all retail-enterprises which fell within its statutory jurisdiction and-(2)-which .had.'a gross-volume of business of at least $500,000 annually. / In. this case, plaintiff and his wife, trading as. Ta-con-y. Beer Distributing Company, operated a licensed, beer distributing concern on Torresdale Avenue, Philadelphia-. Their beer is purchased and consumed within Pennsylvania .and did not and obviously could not interfere with or affect -interstate commerce. Appellants have a gross annual business, of- $230,000. They did not have.a single employee, since the term “employee” as defined by the Act does not include an individual employed-by his parent — supra. It is clear, therefore, that since 1958 the NLRB would not take jurisdiction of this case. Nevertheless, the local union picketed them and is gradually or rapidly putting them out of business; and a majority of this Court have refused-to-enjoin this picketing: By the time the NLRB specifically decides that it Will not take jurisdiction of this case — and there is not *521 the slightest, remotest doubt of its refusal * — the poor little Stryjewski family will be broke, or out of business. One of the many things which it is impossible to comprehend in these troubled days is why so many hypocritical politicians don’t protect, and the unions are equally unwilling to protect, the little fellow (including the small family store) from big business and big unions. The little fellow, including the traditional family store, has been the epitome and the backbone of our Country. Why don’t they let the little businessman eke out a little existence against what everyone knows are great odds? The Majority rely upon San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S., supra. In that case, the Court said (page 245) : “When an activity is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Imagine a business composed of husband and wife and son endangering the national policy! That case is clearly inapposite for the two-fold reason (1) this little business is one of the very few activities which are not arguably ** subject to Section 7 or 8 of the Act, and (2) this little business cannot possibly endanger the national policy. For these reasons, I would issue the injunction prayed for. Italics throughout, ours. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 Ü.S.O. §Í64(c) (1) and (2). The Act provides in part: “(c)(1) The Board; in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules . . . decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute . . •.- Where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. ... (2) Nothing in this sub-chapter shali be deemed to prevent . . the courts of any State . . . from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection-,' to assert jurisdiction.”- (Emphasis supplied.). It is agreed by all the parties that the NLRB has actually decided that it will not take jurisdiction. In these highly controversial and emotional days, the test “arguably” within the jurisdiction of the NLRB is one of the most unrealistic and unjustifiable ever invented. Is there any topic, subject, question or issue upon which there is no argument today? The aforesaid “arguably” test should be quickly changed by Congress or by the Supreme Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9757887. Public record. Not legal advice.