# Babb v. Matlock

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · February 3, 2000 · 340 Ark. 263

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9756515

## Case

- **Full name:** Tiny Standoak BABB, Gregory Franks, Shilena Easter, Michael Easter, Felisha Easter, Frederick Easter, and Daryl Standoak v. Leanna MATLOCK and Curtis Standoak
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** February 3, 2000
- **Citations:** 340 Ark. 263; 9 S.W.3d 508; 2000 Ark. LEXIS 39
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Imber
- **Judges:** Donald L. Corbin
- **Cited by:** 22 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9756515

## Opinion text

ANNABELLE Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring. I agree with the result reached by the majority based upon the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102 (Supp. 1999). Section 16-62-102(d) provides for two categories of in loco parentisbeneficiaries: “persons standing in loco parentis to the deceased person,” and “ persons to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis.'” The first category is written in the present tense. Thus, beneficiary status in that category is accorded only to persons who stand in loco parentis to the deceased at the time of death. The statute’s next phrase defining the second category of in loco parentis beneficiaries can be and should be similarly construed to refer only to persons to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis at the time of death. The use of the past tense in the latter phrase merely indicates that a deceased person cannot stand in loco parentis to anyone following his or her death. Both categories of in loco parentis beneficiaries are thereby capable of being construed consistently and harmoniously. Inequities would necessarily result if the statute were construed otherwise, with beneficiary status being limited to an in loco parentis relationship at the time of death as to one in loco parentis category, but not as to the other in loco parentis category.
For these reasons, I would affirm the probate court’s ruling based upon the plain language of section 16-62-102(d) and our case law interpreting the term in loco parentis.
BROWN, J., joins in this concurrence.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9756515. Public record. Not legal advice.