# Phillips v. Phillips

> Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont) · May 2, 2002 · 75 S.W.3d 564

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9755333

## Case

- **Full name:** James Drew PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. Nancy Jane PHILLIPS, Appellee
- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
- **Decided:** May 2, 2002
- **Citations:** 75 S.W.3d 564; 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 3100; 2002 WL 832548
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Burgess
- **Judges:** Walker, Burgess, Gaultney
- **Cited by:** 38 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9755333

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding in plurality opinion that trial court may not consider fault in division of marital estate when “dissolution of marriage is sought solely on the ground of insupportability”
- affirming trial court’s disproportionate division of property in favor of wife based, in part, on evidence that wife’s parents retained some rights to property, including income, when parents deeded real property to husband and wife
- finding that it was legislature's intent to make decree of no-fault divorce mandatory if party alleges insupportability and establishes statutory elements
- finding no abuse of discretion where trial court used appraisal done eight months before trial

## Opinion text

DON BURGESS, Justice.
DISSENTING OPINION
I respectfully dissent. The majority finds the trial court erred in considering fault and I agree. They go on to hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the division of the community estate. 1 I can not reach the same conclusion. It is clear, at least to me, the trial court considered fault in dividing the community estate. I say it is clear because it appears the trial court divided the estate according to Ms. Phillips’s proposed division and accepted her assigned values totally. Therefore, I am forced to conclude that the error found by the majority probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex. R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1). Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the property division.
. This court has approved unequal divisions, but these were not based upon an erroneous premise.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9755333. Public record. Not legal advice.