# Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater

> Court of Appeals of Maryland · September 21, 2011 · 421 Md. 664

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9754050

## Case

- **Full name:** PRINCE OF PEACE LUTHERAN CHURCH, Et Al. v. Mary LINKLATER
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland
- **Decided:** September 21, 2011
- **Citations:** 421 Md. 664; 28 A.3d 1171; 113 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 670; 2011 Md. LEXIS 574
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part
- **Judges:** Murphy
- **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9754050

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “[although some federal appellate courts have applied the ministerial exception broadly, we agree with the [janalysis by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [that] [t]he First Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships fr…
- holding that the exemption “permits a religious entity to restrict employment ‘connected with the carrying on . . . of its activities’ to members of its own faith” (cleaned up)
- applying the two-year statute of limitations to a similar factual scenario

## Opinion text

ADKINS, J., concurring and dissenting, in which BELL, C.J., and BATTAGLIA, J., join.
I agree with the majority in large part. I respectfully concur and dissent, however, because I think the majority adopts an unduly broad interpretation of the “ministerial exception” to state laws against employment discrimination. Although the majority allows Counts I and III to survive after application of the ministerial exception, its broad reading of the exception leads to its rejection of Linklater’s retaliatory firing claim and other counts of her complaint. The majority views the ministerial exception as barring judicial inquiry into any matter involving “church governance,” 1 and it defines church governance liberally. Applying this broad standard, it concludes that Linklater’s other counts would “necessarily involve judicial inquiry into church governance, and such an inquiry is prohibited by the First Amendment.” Maj. Op. at 696, 28 A.3d at 1189. I submit that, in doing so, the majority blazes an unduly broad trail for the ministerial exception, and that the retaliatory discharge count and others should survive its application. 2
*700 I disagree with the majority’s rationale in one other significant respect. In my view, the majority improperly expands the ministerial exception when it holds that the exception protects, and thus bars Linklater’s use of, the entirety of Pastor Rufus S. Lusk’s February 4, 2001, statements to the congregation. 3
I. The Ministerial Exception
A. Scope
The “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination laws typically prohibits state inquiry into religious-based employment decisions by churches and other religious organizations. See Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 593 , 770 A.2d 111, 127 (2001) (holding that a church was entitled to employ only members of its faith). Religious-based employment decisions typically involve the hiring and firing of “ministers,” which can also include nonclergy. 4
*701 This case presents two conflicting values that the ministerial exception must reconcile: churches’ ability to make spiritual decisions autonomously and the need for churches to abide by the “profound state interest” in assuring equal employment opportunities for all, regardless of sex. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.2000); see also Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir.1985).
The cases upon which the majority relies support the general proposition that many of a church’s employment decisions are insulated from judicial review. Such insulation exists to prevent excessive government intrusion into religious decision making. The majority cites favorably several federal appellate courts explaining, e.g., that “the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom cannot be construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an otherwise religious relationship....” Maj. Op. at 687, 28 A.3d at 1184 (citing Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir.1998)).
But the cases do not categorically prevent all government scrutiny of church employment decisions. Instead, they suggest a more nuanced approach, one that insulates decisions from judicial review only when they are rooted in spiritual matters. The majority recognizes this qualification to a degree, holding that the exception cannot preclude sexual harassment claims. Yet it declines to apply the same qualification when considering the retaliation claim. A quick review of the pertinent cases reveals that the limited contour of the ministerial exception does not warrant its application to Petitioner’s retaliation claim.
Bollard v. The California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.1999), stands for the principle that *702 courts may not inquire into employment decisions if spiritual matters are the motivation behind those decisions. The Bollard court specifically limits its holding to employment decisions made “according to the dictates of faith and conscience.” Id. at 945 . The case also recognizes that sex discrimination is impermissible for a religious organization. Id.
As the majority indicates, Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, supra, instructs that the protection afforded to religious relationships has limitations. Protection from judicial inquiry is given to employment decisions “primarily by preventing the judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes turning on matters of ‘religious doctrine or practice.’ ” Id. at 336 . Thus, Sanders makes clear that employment decisions should not be shielded from judicial scrutiny unless they involve spiritual matters, such as religious doctrine or practice. See id.
McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 , 800 A.2d 840 (2002), and Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.Ct.App.1991), also cited favorably by the majority, strongly support a limited scope for the ministerial exception. The former case held that to. “sweep away all of a minister’s or seminarian’s claims against the church out of fear of encroaching upon the First Amendment” would actually run afoul of the Constitution’s religion clauses. McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 52 , 800 A.2d 840 . The latter case allowed a sexual harassment claim against a church to proceed because it was “unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of church doctrine.” Black, 471 N.W.2d at 721 .
The majority, in disharmonious fashion, both honors and rejects these precedents. To sustain the sexual harassment claim in Count I, the majority relies upon the rationale of these cases, ie., that religious insulation from the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws must be limited to instances in which the church’s conduct is based on theology or doctrine. Yet when it comes to Linklater’s retaliatory constructive discharge claim in Count IV, the majority reverses course, relying on Black v. Snyder, supra, for the categorical statement that such claims “would necessarily involve judicial *703 inquiry into church governance, and such an inquiry is prohibited by the First Amendment.” Maj. Op. at 696, 28 A.3d at 1189. 5 In Black , however, the court denied the retaliatory discharge claim because the church proffered as a reason for the discharge the plaintiffs “inability to conduct the pastoral office efficiently in this congregation in view of local conditions”—and it was the church’s proffered reason, not the nature of the claim in general, that would have “require[d] a similar review of ... an essentially ecclesiastical concern.” 471 N.W.2d at 718-720 . Although I am skeptical of the distinction drawn in Black between the sexual harassment claim (allowed) and the retaliatory discharge claim (disallowed), at least the church in Black offered up an arguably doctrinal rationale for her termination. 6
B. Application
Here, the Church fired Linklater after she failed to show up for one week. Yet, she asserted that she did so only after the Pastor, in retaliation for her filing charges with the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission and in other formalized channels, refused to give her a job performance evaluation, took unfounded disciplinary actions against her, and conducted a campaign to lower her standing in the eyes of the congregation. The Church, in its argument before this Court, proffers no doctrinal or spiritual basis for these actions.
The majority also relies on EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C.Cir.1996), for the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental action that “encroach[es] on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs.” Maj. Op. at 685, 28 A.3d at 1183. Notwithstanding *704 its use of such broad language, that case actually applies a narrow version of the ministerial exception to resolve a case of “pastoral appointment determination.” Id. at 461, 465.
Furthermore, the majority’s selective citation of EEOC v. Catholic University of America, supra, does not paint a complete picture. The majority states that the ministerial exception “precludes any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a church’s ministerial employment decision.” Maj. Op. at 697, 28 A.3d at 1190 (citing Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 ). But Roman Catholic Diocese also held that “the exception shelters certain employment decisions from the scrutiny of civil authorities so as to preserve the independence of religious institutions in performing their spiritual functions.” Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 . Again, the finer language in that case demonstrates that the court engaged in a functional analysis, considering whether the church’s decision involved spiritual or doctrinal concerns.
None of the majority’s cases delineate a ministerial exception as broad as the one that the majority applies in rejecting Linklater’s retaliatory discharge claim. A better approach, based on my study of the cases, is to hold that a court may examine employment claims against a church if they have nothing to do with the spiritual rationale of the ministerial exception. This includes a retaliatory constructive discharge claim if the church does not offer a reason for dismissal related to the “spiritual function” of the church.
Count IV of Respondent’s Complaint, accordingly, survives application of the ministerial exception, as the Church does not assert that it had doctrinal or spiritual grounds for its alleged retaliatory actions. It only argues that the ministerial exception “applies not just to matters of religious scriptures or dogma, but also more broadly to matters of church governance.” Similarly, the Church offers no doctrinal or spiritual basis for the actions for the actions alleged in Count II (Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment), Count V (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), Count X (Negligent Retention and *705 Supervision), Count XIV (Breach of Contract) and Count XV (Breach of Implied Contract). 7
If the church had offered a rationale for firing Linklater related to her spiritual functions, that is, her role as the church’s music director, then the ministerial exception would certainly bar judicial review of that employment decision. By requiring a church to proffer that the decision was spiritual in nature, the underlying interests of both employment discrimination statutes and the ministerial exception are served. Here, the church does not argue that there was a doctrinal or spiritual basis for its decision to fire Linklater, and the majority does not even address whether religious doctrine or spiritual church operations were considered in her dismissal.
II. Pastor Lusk’s Speech To The Congregation
The question of whether the comments contained in the pastor’s speech to the congregation—in which he mentioned the lawsuit, its impact on the congregation, its finances, etc.— has come into play on appeal because Linklater relied on the speech to bring her claim within the applicable period of limitations under the continuing violation doctrine, in response to the Church’s defense that her claim was barred by limitations. The majority holds that the speech to the congregation is protected speech in its entirety, and therefore inadmissible, but that Linklater’s claim is not barred by limitations (on its face) because she alleges other retaliatory actions that occurred with the two-year limitations period. I agree with the majority that Respondent’s claims are not barred by limitations, but do not agree that the entire speech is protected under the First Amendment.
The majority holds that the ministerial exception applies to speech in which a pastor (1) informs the congregation of a pending lawsuit that could affect the church, and (2) proclaims that he or she is innocent of misconduct. Maj. Op. at 695-96, 28 A.3d at 1188-89. I submit that this demarcation of the *706 protective wing of the ministerial exception is overly inclusive, and that in these statements, the pastor spoke and acted outside the range of the exception. 8 Indeed, the majority does not cite, and I have *707 not found, any cases suggesting that the discussion of such matters is protected.
The majority’s rule is especially perilous because it suggests that simply by adding cursory religious content to a statement, a minister gains unlimited freedom to speak with impunity on almost any subject, protected from Title VII and corresponding state claims, as well as from defamation or other tort claims. This rule could allow an unscrupulous minister to use the pulpit to wage a campaign of continued harassment and defamation, cloaked in but unrelated to doctrine or theology.
Lusk was addressing his congregation during the church’s annual meeting. Lusk’s remarks on Linklater took up approximately half of his entire address to the congregation, and they had a very personal tone. He protested to the entire congregation about Linklater’s claim, singling her out by name. Lusk gave assurances that Linklater’s allegations had “no credence.” He described his own personal and familial stress and called the lawsuit a “crisis,” a “quagmire,” and a “personal trial.”
The content and tone of his speech could reasonably be interpreted as trying to sway congregational opinion against Linklater. Lusk encouraged the congregation to obtain a public-record copy of the Complaint that Linklater filed. He singled out another church member by name for representing Linklater and for “demanding a $2.5 million settlement,” calling the settlement negotiation “disturbing.” He even insinuated that Linklater’s claim itself was retaliatory, in that she did not make her allegations until after the church council “expressed displeasure with her performance.”
Lusk made it very clear that his motivation for speaking about Linklater was not spiritual in nature. He specifically said that he was not speaking “in worship or teaching.” His *708 statement had little to do with church governance or an employment decision. Instead, his remarks could reasonably be perceived as an effort to turn congregational sentiment in his own favor and against Linklater. All of these factors operate to remove his remarks from the shelter of the ministerial exception.
For these reasons, I would reach the same result as the majority on Counts I and III, holding that limitations is no bar to Petitioner’s claims. But, I would rely on this speech, in addition to the “photograph stabbing” conduct relied on by the majority, to do so.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge BATTAGLIA authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed in this opinion.
. Maj. Op. at 692-93, 696, 28 A.3d at 1187, 1189.
. In addition to Counts I (Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work Environment) and III (Gender Discrimination), I think Counts II (Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment), IV (Retaliatory Harassment and Constructive Discharge), V (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), X (Negligent Retention and Supervision), XIV (Breach of Contract), and XV (Breach of Implied Contract) survive proper application of the ministerial exception. Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that Count V does not survive a motion to dismiss because it fails to meet our standards for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress generally. I do not address whether the other counts have other, possibly fatal, deficiencies.
. Although I consider this point significant, it is not outcome-determinative as to any count. The issue arises on appeal because the statements were offered by Linklater as an instance of retaliatoiy conduct that fell within the period of limitations, thus saving her claims from dismissal on limitations grounds by virtue of the continuing violation doctrine. The majority concludes that other conduct by the pastor suffices to save Linklater’s claims from a limitations defense. See Maj. Op. at 692-93, 695-96, 28 A.3d at 1189, 1188-89.
. Respondent Maty Linklater is a "minister” for the sake of the ministerial exception. This Court has indicated that a "music director” falls *701 under the ministerial exception. See Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen, 399 Md. 637, 663-64, 674-75, 925 A.2d 659, 674, 681 (2007). Here, Linldater was the director of music ministry, a full-time position. She planned the music of the church in a way that enhanced the church’s theological message.
. The majority also briskly sweeps away Counts IV, V, X, XIV, and XV. Maj. Op. at 696-98, 28 A.3d at 1189-90.
. Furthermore, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.Ct.App.1991), holds that an employment claim against a church is more likely permissible if the plaintiff seeks not reinstatement but only money damages, because adjudication of such a claim "would not require extensive court oversight.” Id. at 721 . Here, Respondent seeks money damages only.
. There may have been other grounds for dismissal of these counts not presented in this appeal.
. The relevant portion of Lusk’s remarks follows:
"St. Paul counsels us to speak the truth in love. This has been difficult to do these past nine months since we are in the midst of a legal action by a staff member Mary Linklater that has necessitated the church leadership’s maintaining confidentiality. Nevertheless I need in this forum to speak a word about the troubles of this past year. I don’t talk about this in worship or teaching, but in council and MMC, and here is a place to address the entire congregation.
"I am the interim pastor. I have no intention of outstaying my usefulness to this congregation. I have been sent here by Bishop Schneider to help you with the transition from one called pastor to another. While I may be the interim pastor I am a real pastor and your presiding pastor. I pray for this congregation, I celebrate your joys and share your agonies. I love this congregation and have done the best I know how to preach and teach and pastor this past year.
"But I am very concerned about the future of this congregation. We face a budget that has either a $60K or $40K deficit depending upon your actions this afternoon. Moreover, as many of you know, Ms. Linklater has filed a complaint with the Montgomery County Human Rights Commission alleging a hostile work environment and other allegations and naming the council, the MMC, the bishop, Neil Howard and myself. This is a public document and you may request a copy. It should be noted that these allegations were only made after the council and MMC expressed displeasure with her performance. More disturbing, a church member, her attorney of record Alice Johnson, has written a letter demanding a $2.5 million settlement for these supposed allegations, hoping that a significant amount of the money would come from me personally.
"One reason I remain your interim pastor is because of the personal request of your bishop, despite the stress these unfounded allegations have caused me and my family. The bishop has complete faith in my ability to see, you through this crisis knowing full well there is no credence to Ms. Linklater’s allegations against me.
"As a member of the nominating committee it was my goal, shared absolutely I believe by all members of the committee to find the best six people in our congregation to lead us out of this quagmire. I believe that we have found those six people, and I would urge you to vote for them while also thanking the other five candidates for their concern and love for Prince of Peace. Whoever you elect today I would hope that the congregation would let the new council do its job in a peaceful fashion. Come to the council when you have business before them, but please let them do their job without micro-managing or trying to intimidate them. Moreover, I would hope that the new council would maintain confidentiality.
"Finally the work of pastoring to the many members of the congregation I have come to know well over the past 15 months, the joy of *707 welcoming new members into this congregation, and my unfailing commitment, despite this personal trial, to the continuance of this Christian community has deeply enriched my faith.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9754050. Public record. Not legal advice.