# Ward v. Zelikovsky

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · June 20, 1994 · 136 N.J. 516

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753333

## Case

- **Full name:** Charles C. Ward and Mary B. Ward, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Johanan Zelikovsky, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 20, 1994
- **Citations:** 136 N.J. 516; 643 A.2d 972; 1994 N.J. LEXIS 503
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stein
- **Judges:** Garibaldi, Stein
- **Cited by:** 123 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753333

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- emphasizing the distinction between actionable statements that are capable of verification and “rhetorical hyperbole” and “statements that are in form statements of opinion . . . which cannot reasonably be understood to be meant literally and seriously and are obviously mere v…
- holding that “[u]nless a statement explicitly or impliedly rests on false facts that damage the reputation of another, the alleged defamatory statement will not be actionable”
- explaining that First Amendment cases require a de novo review
- explaining that defamation law “exists to achieve the proper balance between protecting reputation and protecting free speech”

## Opinion text

STEIN, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s judgment, but only because I agree with the holding that allegations of bigotry do not constitute slander per se, ante at 541-42, 643 A.2d at 984-85, and with the Court’s determination that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of proof of special damages. Ante at 542, 643 A.2d at 985. I cannot agree, however, with the Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ proofs did not establish a cause of action for defamation. Ante at 538-40, 643 A.2d at 983-84.
No one could find fault with the Court’s observation that “the best way to combat bias and prejudice is through the exchange of ideas and speech, not through lawsuits.” Ante at 543, 643 A.2d at 985. But the critical issue presented by this appeal is not whether litigation is the ideal vehicle to combat prejudice, but rather whether plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of defamation to warrant submission of the issue to the jury. The Court’s explanation of the applicable legal principles is virtually flawless, but in my view it errs grievously in applying the law to the facts.
*544 The Court acknowledges that content and context determine whether an accusation of bigotry is defamatory:
Whether an accusation of bigotry is actionable depends on whether the statement appeared to be supported by reasonably specific facts that are capable of objective proof of truth or falsity. The statement might explicitly refer to those specific facts or be made in such manner or under such circumstances as would fairly lead a reasonable listener to conclude that he or she had knowledge of specific facts supporting the conclusory accusation.
[Ante at 539, 643 A.2d at 983.]
In that respect, the Court’s observations track the analysis in the Restatement of Torts on which the Court relies:
The second kind of expression of opinion, or the mixed type, is one which, while an opinion in form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or assumed to exist by the parties to the communication. Here the expression of the opinion gives rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of the opinion expressed by the defendant. To say of a person that he is a thief without explaining why, may, depending upon the circumstances, be found to imply the assertion that he has committed acts that come within the common connotation of thievery.
[Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 comment b (1977).]
The United States Supreme Court recently expressed similar views in assessing the potentially defamatory nature of expressions of opinion:
[EJxpressions of “opinion” may often imply an assertion of objective fact.
If a speaker says, “In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement, “In my opinion Jones is a liar,” can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, “Jones is a liar.”
[Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 , 110 S.Ct 2695, 2705-06 , 111 L.Ed. 2d 1, 17-18 (1990).]
The record informs us that Zelikovsky was the “principal financier” for the slate of directors elected to the board of the Ocean Club condominium association in 1988, a fact that suggests that he was a reasonably influential figure in the association. Apparently, a substantial portion of the association’s membership was Jewish. Zelikovsky’s statements were made at a meeting of the association *545 attended by approximately one hundred residents. While Mrs. Ward was speaking about an unrelated matter, Zelikovsky stood up and shouted the offending words. Depending on whether Mrs. Ward’s or Mr. Ward’s testimony concerning the event is more accurate, Zelikovsky either said “Don’t listen to these people. They don’t like Jews. She’s a bitch. I remember her. She’s a bitch,” or he said “I know her. She’s a bitch. These people, they hate Jews. These people hate Jews.”
The Court goes astray when it concludes that Zelikovsky’s allegations could not be defamatory because “Zelikovsky made no factual statements and did not appear to rely on factual statements known to the audience that would transform his claim of anti-Semitism into an actionable statement.” Ante at 538, 643 A.2d at 983. As. the Restatement makes clear, “[T]he expression of the opinion gives rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of the opinion expressed by the defendant.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 566 comment b. Assuming, as the record suggests, that Zelikovsky was a respected member of the association, the audience was extremely likely to infer that his characterization of the Wards as “Jew haters” was supported by facts, especially when accompanied by the declarations “I know these people” or “I know her.” Those statements imply that Zelikovsky possessed specific information supporting that allegation, the truth or falsity of which would have been verifiable at trial. Although the Court acknowledges that “only if Zelikovsky’s statement suggested specific factual assertions that could be proven true or false could the statement qualify as actionable defamation,” ante at 531, 643 A.2d at 979, the Court appears to be disinclined to recognize that Zelikovsky’s characterization of the Wards strongly implied the existence of underlying facts. If the condominium-association members understood Zelikovsky’s statements to be based on undisclosed facts, their defamatory potential was devastating.
In concluding that Zelikovsky’s statements fall into “the non-actionable category of name-calling * * * not redressable under *546 slander laws,” ante at 538, 643 A.2d at 983, the Court usurps the jury’s function. The Restatement correctly allocates the responsibility of the court and the jury: a court’s duty is “to determine whether an expression of opinion is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning because it may reasonably be understood to imply the assertion of undisclosed facts that justify the expressed opinion,” and the jury’s function is “to determine whether that meaning was attributed to it by the recipient of the communication.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 566 comment c (emphasis added).
Because Zelikovsky’s statements were “capable of bearing a defamatory meaning,” the Court errs in concluding as a matter of law that the issue should not have been submitted to the jury.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the judgment.
For reversed and remandment—Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI—7.
Concurring in result—Justice STEIN.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753333. Public record. Not legal advice.
