# Curtis v. Porter

> Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · November 15, 2001 · 784 A.2d 18

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753249

## Case

- **Full name:** Barbara CURTIS v. Lisa Gagne PORTER
- **Court:** Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
- **Decided:** November 15, 2001
- **Citations:** 784 A.2d 18; 2001 ME 158; 2001 Me. LEXIS 161
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Clifford
- **Judges:** Wathen, Clifford, Rudman, Dana, Saufley, Alexander, Calkins
- **Cited by:** 458 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753249

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that a separate duty to act reasonably to avoid emotional harm to others arises in the limited circumstance where "a special relationship exists between the actor and the person emotionally harmed" and that negligent infliction claims are "routinely added to compla…
- explaining, in the NIED context, that there is no “general duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm,” but rather that this duty is recognized in “very limited circumstances” such as in “bystander liability actions” or where “a special relationship exists between the ac…
- stating that when the separate tort at issue, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, allows one to recover for emotional suffering, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is usually subsumed in an award entered on the separate tort
- holding that, except in bystander liability claims or when “a special relationship exists between the actor and the person emotionally harmed,” there is “no . . . general duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm to others”

## Opinion text

CLIFFORD, J.,
with whom RUDMAN, J. joins, dissenting.
[¶ 24] Because, in my view, the Superior Court properly analyzed the facts in the statements of material facts and correctly entered summary judgment for Gagne on Curtis’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 25] Although there is evidence from which a jury could infer that Gagne had some knowledge that Porter and Fifield were contemplating a theft of pizza, in my view there is nothing to point to Gagne’s participation in any planning of the theft. Moreover, Curtis’s emotional distress was caused not by the theft of the pizza, but by the assault that was committed by Alan Porter, an action that was not foreseen even by Ryan Fifield, who participated in the theft with Porter.
[¶ 26] In my view, Curtis has failed to present sufficient evidence from which, without engaging in speculation, a jury could rationally infer that Gagne was “substantially certain that [Curtis’s severe emotional] distress would result from [Gagne’s] conduct” or that Gagne’s conduct was so “extreme or outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” or that her actions “caused [Curtis] severe emotional distress.” Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 15 , 711 A.2d 842, 847 .
[¶ 27] I would affirm the Superior Court’s judgment in full.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753249. Public record. Not legal advice.