# Commonwealth v. Matthews > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · December 29, 1971 · 446 Pa. 65 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753215 ## Case - **Full name:** Commonwealth v. Matthews, Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** December 29, 1971 - **Citations:** 446 Pa. 65; 285 A.2d 510; 1971 Pa. LEXIS 604 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Pomeroy - **Judges:** Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Babbibbi, Bobebts, Bell - **Cited by:** 95 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753215 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - affirming denial of motion to suppress because, “[t]o rule otherwise, merely because the warrant specified a ‘pocket knife’ whereas ‘a kitchen knife’ was seized would be hypertechnical and contrary to the common-sense approach mandated by [the United States Supreme Court]” - finding valid warrant which specified “pocket knife” but officers seized “kitchen knife” ## Opinion text Dissenting Opinion by Mr. Justice Pomeroy: Among appellant’s several assignments of error is the trial court’s refusal of a specific request for an instruction to the jury on the elements of voluntary manslaughter as being one of the possible verdicts the jury may return in a murder case. The opinion of this Court summarily rejects this assignment on the ground that . . there was no evidence which pointed in the *79 slightest degree to the offense of manslaughter”. There is, admittedly, precedential support for this conclusion, and it reflects the long standing practice in our criminal courts. Upon reflection, however, I believe that logic and fairness mandate a different result, and I therefore respectfully dissent. Because of the brevity of the majority’s treatment of this issue, it may be helpful to summarize the current status of the law with respect to (1) jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter, and (2) the return by the jury of a voluntary manslaughter verdict in trials for murder wherein there has been no evidence to support such a verdict. While it is considered felonious, voluntary manslaughter is the least culpable form of homicide included within a murder indictment. Thus, when considering the degree of culpability of an individual being tried under such an indictment, a jury may return a voluntary manslaughter verdict if it finds that the killing, although intentional, was committed without malice; that is, the accused may be shown to have been acting under the influence of sudden passion which was caused by legally adequate provocation that placed him beyond the control of reason. 1 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Walters, 431 Pa. 74 , 244 A. 2d 757 (1968); Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371 , 69 Atl. 891 *80 (1908). These elements need not always be present, however, to support a voluntary manslaughter verdict. Pennsylvania courts have long accepted the common law rule that the jury has the power to find a defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter even in the absence of passion or provocation, where the evidence is sufficient to support a first or second degree murder verdict. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348 , 266 A. 2d 726 (1970); Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59 , 122 Atl. 166 (1923); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. & R. 423 (1821). Although superficially such a rule may seem incongruous, it does have a rational basis. In essence, the rationale of the rule is founded on two considerations: (1) the legal concept that voluntary manslaughter is by definition a lesser offense than murder but one included within a murder indictment, (2) a realistic appreciation of the fact that factors such as sympathy or extenuating circumstances may lead a jury to find a defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter even though the evidence is enough to establish guilt of murder in the second or even the first degree. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, supra. Imposed upon this conceptual framework is a second rule which the majority here reaffirms. That rule gives a trial judge complete discretion in deciding whether or not to submit voluntary manslaughter to the jury as a possible verdict in a case where there is no evidence of passion or provocation. See e.g., Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113 , 112 A. 2d 362 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Yeager, 329 Pa. 81 , 196 Atl. 827 (1938). The reason for this rule is said to be that a charge on a point or issue which is unsupported by any evidence “. . . is likely to confuse the jury and obstruct justice”. Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571 , 220 A. 2d 807 (1966). *81 Thus, while a jury has the power to return a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter in every case tried pursuant to a murder indictment, this power may be effectively negated by the decision of a trial judge to refuse to charge the jury on this point. In making this decision, the judge has no standards to guide him and there are no safeguards which would militate against the exercise of whim or caprice. In discussing this anomolous situation in his dissenting opinion in. Commonwealth v. Pavillard, supra, Mr. Justice Cohen (joined by Mr. Justice Jones) cogently stated: “How is a jury able to exercise its power [to bring in a voluntary manslaughter verdict] when it is never advised that it has such power? That rule has led to arbitrary justice . . . since trial judges have capriciously chosen to charge the doctrine or not.” In my view, the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require the abandonment of the procedure now again sanctioned by the court. Due process is violated where a state procedure denies to those subject to it the fundamental fairness required in a system of ordered liberty. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 , 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952). The procedure here, grounded as it is upon the exercise of absolute discretion by the trial judge, without the benefit of any objective standards to guide him, is patently arbitrary and unfair. Likewise, the equal protection clause is offended where a state cannot show a rational basis for discrimination between persons or groups of persons. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 30 L. Ed. 225 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969). In the case at bar, it seems impossible to discover a rational nexus between the Common *82 wealth’s interest in keeping from the jury instructions which might lead a jury to return a less harsh verdict or perhaps even a logically unjustified verdict, and the method by which the Commonwealth seeks to vindicate that interest. It would seem that the interest of the Commonwealth is adequately protected by the fact that the trial judge may, indeed should, advise the jury that, where no evidence of provocation or passion has been presented, a verdict of voluntary manslaughter would not be warranted. Commonwealth v. Yeager, supra. 2 *83 It has been said that onr “. . . constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both [call] for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations betwen persons and different groups of persons. Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system—all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, stand on an equity before the bar of justice in every American court.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 , 100 L. Ed. 891 , 898 (1956). Seeking to apply this principle to the situation before us, I am of the view that as long as we allow juries the latitude we do in homicide cases, as above set forth, criminal defendants must be treated equally by informing all juries of tbe verdicts they have the power to return. This means that the trial court should not have discretion whether or not to instruct on the elements of voluntary manslaughter; it should he obliged to do so in every murder trial, but with proper cautionary admonition such as that set forth in footnote 2. I would vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial. Mr. Justice Bobebts joins in this dissenting opinion. The difference in culpability between first or second degree murder on the one hand and voluntary manslaughter on the other is reflected in the punishments which accompany conviction of these respective offenses. Thus, a conviction for first degree murder carries with it a sentence of death or life imprisonment. Sanctions that may properly be imposed upon one found guilty of second degree murder include imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years and a fine up to ten thousand dollars. Act of June 24, 1939, P. Ij. 872, §701, 18 P.S. §4701. Punishment for voluntary manslaughter, in contrast, may not exceed twelve years imprisonment and six thousand dollars fine. Act of June 24, 1939, supra, §703, 18 P.S. §4703. An example of an acceptable jury charge in the circumstances of the instant case can be found in Daub, Pennsylvania Trial Guide, §618.5: “Under the law, you are entitled to bring in a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. That is a question for you and we may not interfere with your judgment in the matter. In our opinion there is no evidence of any sufficient cause of provocation which, if this were a malicious killing, would reduce it to voluntary manslaughter, but that is our opinion merely and it is not binding upon you. It is for you and you alone to say whether this was a case of voluntary manslaughter and we have no right to decide that issue. One of the permissible verdicts in cases of this type is a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter and the court has no right to deprive you of the privilege of so declaring if you wish.” I would distinguish this type of admonition from what I believe to be improper judicial comments which suggest a verdict of guilty or not guilty, or directly express an opinion on the accused’s guilt or innocence. An instruction such as suggested above merely suggests to the jury that the evidence is insufficient to show passion or provocation. In my view, such a jury charge conforms with the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, which permit the court to comment on the evidence provided that the jury is “. . . clearly and unequivocally instructed that it is the exclusive judge of the facts . . . and that it is not bound by the comments of the court.” §4.7 (Approved Draft, 1968). In no way does the above proposed instruction imply that a not guilty verdict would be improper, nor could the jury infer from such a comment that a second or first degree murder verdict would be impermissible; the jury remains untainted by any judicial suggestion of the ultimate guilt (or degree of guilt) or innocence of the accused. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9753215. Public record. Not legal advice.