# Beard v. Edmondson and Gallagher

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · January 24, 2002 · 790 A.2d 541

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9751395

## Case

- **Full name:** Charles J. BEARD, Et Al., Appellants, v. EDMONDSON AND GALLAGHER, Appellee
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** January 24, 2002
- **Citations:** 790 A.2d 541; 2002 D.C. App. LEXIS 15; 2002 WL 87363
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Ruiz
- **Judges:** Ruiz, Reid, Glickman
- **Cited by:** 52 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9751395

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the continuous tort doctrine applies where the “wrongfulness and injuriousness of tortious activity may be discernible only from the continuation over time of a course of conduct”
- rejecting application of the continuous-tort doctrine for tortious interference claims

## Opinion text

RUIZ, Associate Judge,
concurring:
This is a straightforward case, so I have no trouble agreeing that the cause of action for tortious interference with contract arose well before the three-year limitations period prior to commencement of the lawsuit and is therefore time-barred. The facts are clear that appellant knew that it had a cause of action against appellee, but failed to file at the time it filed a related case against another defendant. No damages can be awarded on those stale claims. To the extent that the defendant continued its tortious interference over time and into the limitations period, the majority recognizes that claims based on those activities are not time-barred and would be actionable if they had resulted in compensable damages.
Not all continuing violations are the same, however. Where, unlike here, the nature of the violation is such that to claim redress it is necessary to prove sustained conduct, or a pattern and practice, the time when the claim comes into existence can be less than clear. The usual concern about staleness “disappears” so long as some act that is part of such a continuing violation occurs within the limitations period. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 , 102 S.Ct. 1114 , 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). Certain discrimination claims are examples. See id. (practice of racial steering under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 , 3612(a)); Morgan v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir.2000) cert. granted, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 2547 , 150 L.Ed.2d 715 , 69 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. June 25, 2001) (No. 00-1624) (employment discrimination based on hostile working environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). Moreover, there are policy reasons grounded in the broad remedial purpose of civil rights statutes giving rise to such claims as well as practical considerations in an ongoing relationship that warrant an approach that comports with the reality of a continuing practice of discrimination. These types of claims are not implicated here and, therefore, are not addressed by the court’s opinion in this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9751395. Public record. Not legal advice.