# Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Department of Public Welfare

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · February 29, 2012 · 614 Pa. 574

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9751123

## Case

- **Full name:** The PENNSYLVANIA MEDICAL SOCIETY, on Behalf of Itself and All of Its Members, and Peter M. Daloni, M.D., Karen A. Rizzo, M.D. and Martin D. Trichtinger, M.D., Appellees v. the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF the COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania and Office of the Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellants; The Hospital and Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania, Geisinger Health System, St. Vincent Health Center and Abington Memorial Hospital, Appellees v. the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of the Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 29, 2012
- **Citations:** 614 Pa. 574; 39 A.3d 267
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Todd
- **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Melvin
- **Cited by:** 32 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9751123

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that association of health care providers had interest in litigation based on possible increased future assessments so as to confer standing to challenge Department of Public Welfare’s administration of abatement law

## Opinion text

Justice TODD,
concurring.
I join the majority’s reversal of the Commonwealth Court’s order granting summary relief to Appellees. Indeed, I agree with the majority’s determination that the Health Care Provider Retention Law gave the Budget Secretary discretionary authority with regard to the transfer of monies from the Health Care Provider Retention Account (“HCPR Account”) to the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund (“MCARE Fund”), and, thus, I too conclude that Appellees’ vested rights theory has no foundation. See 40 P.S. § 1303.1112(c) (repealed). I also agree with the majority there is no factual predicate for Appellees’ Uniformity Clause challenge.
I do not, however, agree with the majority that Appellees have standing to maintain these actions, as I conclude they failed to demonstrate they are aggrieved by the Commonwealth’s decision not to transfer monies from the MCARE Fund in an amount sufficient to fully fund assessment abatements granted from 2003 to 2007. See City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 559-60 , 838 A.2d 566, 577 (2003) (“The [standing] doctrine’s core conception [is] that a party who is not negatively affected by the matter he seeks to challenge is not aggrieved, and thus, has no right to obtain judicial resolution of his challenge.”). As the Commonwealth demonstrates, the statutory formula for assessment calculation, as applied by Pennsylvania’s Insurance Commissioner since the MCARE Fund’s creation in 2002, does not take the Fund’s balance into account. See 40 P.S. § 1303.712(d). Thus, Appellees’ assertion of harm in the form of increased assessments they will have pay in the future, which the majority accepts, is not only premised on a mere allegation, but is, in fact, unsupportable, given the manner by which assessments are currently calculated and collected. Accord *606 ingly, in my view, the Commonwealth Court’s order could be reversed on the basis of standing alone.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9751123. Public record. Not legal advice.