# Frendak v. United States

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · October 24, 1979 · 408 A.2d 364

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750812

## Case

- **Full name:** Paula J. FRENDAK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee; UNITED STATES v. Paula J. FRENDAK
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** October 24, 1979
- **Citations:** 408 A.2d 364; 1979 D.C. App. LEXIS 463
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kern
- **Judges:** Ferren, Kern, Gallagher, Fer-Ren
- **Cited by:** 135 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750812

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that when evidence raises a substantial question about the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, the trial judge must conduct an inquiry to assure that the defendant intelligently and freely chooses to raise or waive the insanity defense
- noting that the trial court has discretion to interpose an insanity defense over a defendant’s objection only if the court is convinced, after proper inquiry, that defendant cannot make a voluntary and intelligent decision on the matter
- recognizing the special concerns presented when a defendant's mental health is questioned

## Opinion text

KERN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
This case poses for the trial court quite a difficult question: What action should a trial judge take when confronted with evidence which raises a “sufficient question as to a defendant’s mental responsibility at the time of the crime,” yet the defendant, adjudged competent to stand trial, insists the defense of insanity should not be raised? On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to “forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts.” On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Wha-lem, emphasize that criminal defendants *382 must be allowed themselves to make the truly significant decisions concerning the course of their defense.
This court, properly in my view, accommodates Whalem with Alford and Faretta by concluding that when there is evidence sufficient to support the defense of insanity yet the defendant objects to raising such defense
we require the judge to respect the choice of a defendant capable of voluntarily and intelligently making that choice. The court will now have the discretion to raise an insanity defense sua sponte only if the defendant is not capable of making, and has not made, an intelligent and voluntary decision. [At 379; (emphasis added.)]
It seems to me that our decision enables a trial judge to strike the proper balance between preventing guilt from being imposed upon a defendant not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal act yet permitting the defendant, who is capable of choosing and who must bear the ultimate consequence of his choice, to decide finally whether to accept conviction and risk possible imprisonment or to avoid criminal responsibility and risk possible hospitalization.
Given the extraordinary importance to both the community and a defendant of his decision to waive the insanity defense, it seems correct to conclude, as we do in this opinion, that a defendant’s competency to undergo trial, standing alone, does not automatically mean that at trial he is also capable of “voluntarily and intelligently” waiving the defense of insanity. Rather, this court concludes, (At 380):
[T]he trial judge must conduct an inquiry designed to assure that the defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends the consequences of failing to assert the defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the defense.
Here, the conscientious trial judge, with the assistance of amicus, assumed that since the defendant was competent to stand trial, it followed she was competent also to decide not to raise the defense of insanity. However, he expressed “reservations about her ability to appreciate all facets [of her decision not to defend on the basis of insanity] if a higher degree of competency [than competency to stand trial] is required with respect to the ability to make that decision.” Under these circumstances a remand is necessary so that the trial court can ascertain whether the defendant was capable of waiving the insanity defense. If so, the court must accept her decision and proceed to impose punishment; if not, proceedings appropriate after a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity must take place.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750812. Public record. Not legal advice.