# Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 13, 2012 · 614 Pa. 606

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750724

## Case

- **Full name:** GIANT EAGLE, INC., Appellant v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (GIVNER), Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 13, 2012
- **Citations:** 614 Pa. 606; 39 A.3d 287
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Saylor
- **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, McCaffery, Melvin, Todd
- **Cited by:** 19 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

*626 Justice SAYLOR,
dissenting.
I have several differences with the lead Justices’ reasoning regarding the meaning of “compensation,” as used in Section 314(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 1 First, to the extent that the lead opinion proceeds under a plain language interpretation of the statute, see, e.g., Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (“OAJC”), at 297 (asserting that the determination is derived from, inter alia, exploring Section 314(a)’s “plain language”), that position is undermined by its assertion that the provision is ambiguous. See, e.g., id. at 294 (“Because there are at least two valid interpretations of ‘compensation’ as used in Section 314(a), there exists an ambiguity.”). Moreover, the text of a statute cannot be both clear and ambiguous, as those are mutually exclusive propositions. Compare 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”), with id. § 1921(c) (“When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters.... ”).
Insofar as the lead Justices find that the meaning of the term is unclear from the face of Section 314(a), I agree. Nonetheless, I am not of the opinion that “compensation” has two definitions when used in that provision. The lead opinion concludes that, while the word will generally pertain to wage loss benefits, it may also denote wage loss and medical benefits “in the proper circumstances.” OAJC, at 294. Thus, the lead Justices find that the Workers’ Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) is vested with the discretion to determine whether to deprive a non-compliant claimant of wage loss benefits or wage loss and medical benefits. See id. at 295-96.
In my view, the General Assembly intended for “compensation” to have a single meaning in Section 314(a), i.e., either wage loss benefits or wage loss and medical benefits. As noted in the lead opinion, that provision requires the WCJ to deprive the claimant of the “right to compensation, under this *627 article” when — without reasonable cause or excuse — the claimant refuses or neglects to comply with the WCJ’s order to submit to a physical examination or expert interview. 77 P.S. § 651(a). Neither the WCAB nor Section 314(a) define the term “compensation,” and although the provision’s “right to compensation, under this article” language would seem to suggest that “compensation” has a uniform meaning throughout Article III of the Act, this is not the case. Indeed, and as developed in the lead opinion, the term has, at times, been construed to implicate wage loss benefits, but, in other provisions, it has been interpreted to pertain to wage loss and medical benefits. See OAJC at 291-94 (citations omitted). As such, the meaning of “compensation” is not clear from the face of Section 314(a), thereby resulting in an ambiguity. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).
It stands to reason, though, that the term has a single definition for purposes of that section. To my knowledge, until this case, no appellate court of this Commonwealth had ever concluded that “compensation” had two meanings when used within the same provision in Article III. Rather, it had always been thought that the word denoted either wage loss benefits or wage loss and medical benefits, depending on the discrete statutory context in which the term was employed. Cf. Berwick Indus, v. WCAB (Spaid), 537 Pa. 326, 329 , 643 A.2d 1066, 1067 (1994) (collecting cases). Accordingly, and in the absence of express language indicating otherwise, I believe that, in keeping with the other provisions of Article III, the Legislature meant for “compensation” to have a single definition under Section 314(a).
Nor do I agree that the General Assembly vested the WCJ with the discretion to ultimately determine which benefits to suspend when — without reasonable cause or excuse — a claimant refuses or neglects to comply with the WCJ’s order to submit to a physical examination or expert interview. See, e.g., OAJC, at 296. Generally, when the Legislature allocates discretionary authority, it does so explicitly. See, e.g., 77 P.S. § 2501(h) (“The secretary may adopt additional rules to establish standards and procedures for the evaluation, training, *628 promotion and discipline of workers’ compensation judges.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the assembly did just that when it assigned WCJs the power to grant employers’ petitions under Section 314(a). See id. § 651(a) (stating, among other things, that the WCJ “may at any time after such first examination or expert interview, upon petition of the employer, order the employe to submit himself to such further physical examinations or expert interviews” (emphasis added)). Notably, the Legislature did not allot such authority with respect to depriving a non-compliant claimant of “compensation”; instead, it made the removal of “compensation” mandatory. Id. (providing, in relevant part, that the WCJ “shall deprive [the claimant] of the right to compensation, under this article, during the continuance of such refusal or neglect” (emphasis added)).
Therefore, to accept the lead Justices’ construction of Section 314(a), one would have to find that the General Assembly departed from its convention of explicitly allocating discretionary authority and, instead, implicitly granted the WCJ the power to decide which benefits to suspend by way of the definition of “compensation.” If the Legislature had intended for such a highly unusual scheme, I believe that it would have expressly indicated that in the statute. I am also not familiar with any method of statutory interpretation in which a mandatory provision is converted into a quasi-discretionary one whereby a WCJ is ultimately reposited with the authority to determine the meaning of a central term, according to the facts and circumstances presented.
Further, I am troubled by the lead opinion’s treatment of the statutorily prescribed factors for ascertaining legislative intent. See OAJC, at 294-95. While initially listing most of these codified canons of construction, the lead Justices appear to examine only one factor in its two pages of analysis: the consequences of a particular interpretation. See id. (only citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6)). When performing a detailed review of the statutorily prescribed factors, however, it appears that the Legislature intended for “compensation” to denote both wage loss and medical benefits in Section 314(a).
*629 Beginning with the occasion for the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be attained, and the contemporaneous legislative history, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(1), (3), (4), (7), the WCA, as a whole, is intended to benefit the worker. See, e.g., Harper & Collins v. WCAB (Brown), 543 Pa. 484, 490 , 672 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1996). 2 The Act has been amended a number of times since it originally became law, most recently in 1996. That year, the Legislature passed Act 57. 3 In addition to preserving the underlying remedial purpose of the WCA, Act 57 introduced a cost-containment overlay to the workers’ compensation scheme. Among its many revisions, Act 57 gave employers the ability to subject a claimant to a physical examination or expert interview at anytime after an injury. See 77 P.S. § 651(a). Because such examinations are likely the only means by which employers can determine the existence and/or the extent of a change in a claimant’s vocational capacity or medical condition, see, e.g., Linton v. WCAB (Amcast Indus. Corp.), 895 A.2d 677, 682 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), this amendment provided employers with a mechanism to enforce their rights under the WCA. See, e.g., Rauch v. WCAB (Kids Wear Servs., Inc.), 808 A.2d 291, 295-96 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002).
Act 57’s focus on cost-containment is also supported by its legislative history. According to a number of lawmakers, the General Assembly enacted the legislation based on the belief that its predecessor, Act 44, 4 failed to reduce workers’ compensation insurance rates for employers. 5 Indeed, several *630 legislators expressed their concern that — without reform— Pennsylvania businesses would re-locate to surrounding states to avoid the “spiraling costs of workers’ compensation insurance.” Legislative Journal, Senate, supra, at 2159; see, e.g., Legislative Journal, House 1602 (June 19,1996) (“How do we compete for new jobs — or keep the ones we have — when companies tell us that, next to taxes, our outrageously high workers’ compensation costs are the biggest issue businesses face?”).
Turning to the consequences of a particular interpretation, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6), construing “compensation” to only refer to wage loss benefits would not further the objectives of Act 57 and Section 314(a) in a range of circumstances. For instance, suspension would be ineffectual where the claimant was receiving negligible or no wage loss benefits, but continuing to receive medical benefits, e.g., where the claimant has returned to work. In those cases, suspending wage loss benefits would not likely engender compliance with the WCJ’s directive to submit to a physical examination or expert interview, as the claimant would incur little or no penalty for failing to comply with that order, thus rendering the statute’s enforcement mechanism meaningless. This, in turn, would inhibit the employer from exercising its rights under the WCA, as the employer would be unable to evaluate the existence and/or the extent of a change in the claimant’s vocational capacity or medical condition. In sum, to allow “compensation” to be construed as only encompassing wage loss benefits would not promote the cost-containment overlay of Act 57, and therefore, fail to effectuate the purpose behind the legislation.
Although this interpretation of the term may seem harsh, as it results in a claimant losing all of his or her workers’ compensation benefits, it is appropriate when considering the design of the statute. First, a claimant only loses wage loss *631 and medical benefits after a series of steps. The employer must initially petition the WCJ to have the claimant submit to a physical examination or interview, and the WCJ must then grant that petition, which it need not do. The claimant must thereafter refuse or neglect to comply with the WCJ’s order, subject to exceptions. Only then is the claimant deprived of wage loss and medical benefits. See 77 P.S. § 651(a). The claimant is thus afforded considerable opportunities to prevent the suspension of his or her benefits.
Second, a claimant is not deprived of those benefits in every instance in which the claimant does not comply with the WCJ’s directive, but rather, only when the claimant does so “without reasonable cause or excuse.” Id. Presumably, this language accounts for those instances where the claimant reasonably fails to attend a WCJ-mandated physical examination or expert interview, for example, due to an illness. Therefore, the WCJ is allowed to consider the circumstances surrounding the claimant’s absence before directing the suspension of wage loss and medical benefits, as Section 314(a) requires.
Lastly, those benefits are not permanently suspended, but instead, are only removed “during the continuance of such refusal or neglect.” Id. Thus, even after the WCJ suspends wage loss and medical benefits, the claimant is not forever barred from receiving those benefits. The claimant only has to comply with the WCJ’s order to again obtain wage loss and medical benefits.
Accordingly, I would hold that “compensation,” as used in Section 314(a), denotes both wage loss and medical benefits.
Chief Justice CASTILLE and Justice ORIE MELVIN join this Dissenting Opinion.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, art. Ill, § 314 (as amended 77 P.S. § 651(a)) (the "WCA” or the "Act”).
. See generally 82 Am.Jur.2d Workers’ Compensation § 1 ("The philosophy underlying workers' compensation laws is that industrial accidents are inevitable incidents of modern industry and that their burden should not be borne by the victim.”).
. See Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, No. 57 ("Act 57”).
. See Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 190, No. 44 (“Act 44”).
. See, e.g., Legislative Journal, Senate 2159 (June 19, 1996) ("[T]he number one issue that we heard, before Act 44 and since Act 44, has been the cost of doing business in Pennsylvania, the cost of trying to compete to create jobs in Pennsylvania."); id. at 2169 ("The perception of Pennsylvania in the area of workers’ compensation is that we are one of the highest rated States in the nation, and that the cost of doing business, because of workers' compensation, is a hindrance.”); id. at *630 2176 (expressing the view that Act 44 did not deliver on its promise of significantly reducing workers’ compensation insurance rates for employers); id. at 2177 (arguing that Act 57 ’’will go greatly in curbing costs, it will achieve greatly in retaining and the ability to create jobs and job expansion, and it will provide full coverage for those who are in need of that coverage”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750724. Public record. Not legal advice.