# Khan v. Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System

> California Court of Appeal · August 3, 2010 · 187 Cal. App. 4th 98

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750137

## Case

- **Full name:** ABRAHAM KHAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES CITY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** August 3, 2010
- **Citations:** 187 Cal. App. 4th 98; 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417; 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 1283
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Mallano
- **Judges:** Johnson, Mallano
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750137

## Opinion text

MALLANO, P. J.,
Dissenting. — I would affirm the judgment because Assembly Bill No. 1099 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1099) provides that judges who retire under both the Judges’ Retirement System (JRS) and the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System (LACERS) are entitled to have their LACERS retirement benefits calculated using their highest salary earned under the systems.
In 1997, the City of Los Angeles and the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) entered into an agreement pursuant to Government Code sections 20351 and 20353 1 whereby retirees of both systems would be entitled to have their retirement benefits calculated using their highest salary earned under the systems.
In 2001, Assembly Bill 1099 amended section 20639 to add the Judges’ Retirement System II: “The compensation eamable during any period of *118 service as a member of the Judges’ Retirement System, the Judges’ Retirement System U, the Legislators’ Retirement System, or the Defined Benefit Program of the State Teachers’ Retirement Plan shall be considered compensation eamable as a member of [PERS] for purposes of computing final compensation for the member, if he or she retires concurrently under both systems. . . .”
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill 1099 states in part as follows: “Existing law establishes reciprocity between specific public retirement systems, thereby allowing a member of more than one qualifying system to use the compensation earned while a member of one of those reciprocal systems to calculate benefits under the other system, subject to specified limitations. Under the Public Employees’ Retirement Law, compensation eamable during any period of service as a member of specified retirement systems is considered compensation eamable as a member of the Public Employees’ Retirement System for purposes of computing final compensation for the member, as specified.”
The following syllogism demonstrates that judges who retire under both JRS and LACERS are entitled to have their LACERS retirement benefits calculated at their highest salary under the systems.
JRS earnings are treated as PERS earnings (§ 20639).
Retirees from both PERS and LACERS are entitled to have their retirement benefits calculated at their highest salary earned under the systems (per agreement between PERS and LACERS).
Ergo, judges who retire under both JRS and LACERS are entitled to have their LACERS retirement benefits calculated using their highest salary under the systems.
LACERS argues this cannot be so because it has no reciprocal agreement with JRS, and JRS would not consider the salary earned under LACERS in determining JRS benefits. That may be the case, but it is beside the point because the Legislature has provided that JRS retirees be treated the same as PERS retirees who — by agreement with LACERS — are entitled to have their benefits calculated using the highest salary earned under the systems. 2
LACERS attacks in a footnote the letter from the Judicial Council of California supporting Khan’s position as “a misleading letter from a former *119 JRS employee (improperly provided on stationary [sz'c] from the Judicial Council of California).” In turn, Khan attacks a declaration of a PERS employee supporting LACERS’s position as “simply a staff opinion rendered as to a disputed matter with a specific applicant” written by a nonlawyer “not. . . qualified to render a legal opinion.”
The two documents are not determinative of this appeal because, given the legislative intent clearly expressed in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill 1099 and the plain meaning of section 20639, Khan is entitled to retire from both LACERS and JRS and have his LACERS retirement calculated at his highest salary. Accordingly, I would affirm.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 17, 2010, S186213. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
All section references are to the Government Code.
At oral argument, LACERS contended that our state Constitution would forbid the Legislature from doing so, but this matter was not raised in the trial court or in LACERS’s brief on appeal, so neither the majority nor I discuss the issue.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750137. Public record. Not legal advice.