# Niedle v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

> California Court of Appeal · March 15, 2001 · 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750004

## Case

- **Full name:** ANTONETTE NIEDLE, Petitioner, v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, LA SALSA HOLDING COMPANY Et Al., Respondents
- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** March 15, 2001
- **Citations:** 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534; 87 Cal. App. 4th 283
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Turner
- **Judges:** Godoy Perez
- **Cited by:** 6 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750004

## Opinion text

TURNER, P. J.
I concur in the judgment. I write separately to emphasize why there has been no denial of the constitutional right to travel. In Saenz v. Roe (1999) 526 U.S. 489, 500 [ 119 S.Ct. 1518, 1525 , 143 L.Ed.2d 689 ], the United States Supreme Court identified three separate situations in which the travel right had been defined in its prior decisions. The Supreme Court held: “The ‘right to travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three different *294 components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.” (Ibid.)
The first aspect of the constitutional travel right is “the right to go from one place to another, including the right to cross state'borders while en route . . . .” (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 500 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1525 ].) In Saenz , the Supreme Court examined a California law which limited the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents. The Supreme Court concluded that such a reduction in the amount of welfare benefits did not constitute an obstacle to entry into this state. (Id. at p. 501 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1525 ].) In the present case, the funding requirement imposed by Labor Code section 4644, subdivision (g) obviously does not interfere with the right of an injured employee to cross state borders.
The second aspect of the constitutional travel right finds its basis in article IV, section 2 of United States Constitution, the privileges and immunities clause, which states, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” In Saenz , the United States Supreme Court set forth the pertinent privileges and immunities clause analysis as follows: “Thus, by virtue of a person’s state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to enjoy the ‘Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States’ that he visits. This provision removes ‘from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States.’ Paul v. Virginia [(1868) 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 179 [ 19 L.Ed. 357, 359-360 ]] (‘[W]ithout some provision . . . removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists’). It provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a State whether to obtain employment, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 [ 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 ] (1978), to procure medical services, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 [ 93 S.Ct. 739, 751-752 , 35 L.Ed.2d 201 ] (1973), or even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 [ 68 S.Ct. 1156 , 92 L.Ed. 1460 ] (1948). Those protections are not ‘absolute,’ but the Clause ‘does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.’ Id., at 396. There may be a substantial reason for requiring the nonresident to pay more than the resident for a hunting license, see Baldwin v. [Montana\ *295 Fish and Game Comm’n . . . , 436 U.S. 371, 390-391 [ 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1863-1864 , 56 L.Ed.2d 354 ] (1978), or to enroll in the state university, see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 [ 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2232-2233 , 37 L.Ed.2d 63 ] (1973), but our cases have not identified any acceptable reason for qualifying the protection afforded by the Clause for ‘the “citizen of State A who ventures into State B” to settle there and establish a home.’ Zobel [v. Williams (1982) 457 U.S. 55, 74 [ 102 S.Ct. 2309, 2320 , 72 L.Ed.2d 672 ]] (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Permissible justifications for discrimination between residents and nonresidents are simply inapplicable to a nonresident’s exercise of the right to move into another State and become a resident of that State.” (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 501-502 [119 S.Ct. at pp. 1525-1526], fn. omitted.)
As can be noted, the United States Supreme Court in Saenz held there can be constitutionally legitimate discrimination under the privileges and immunities clause and cited to its prior decision in Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at page 396 [ 68 S.Ct. at page 1162 ]. In Toomer, the Supreme Court set forth the standard of review of a privileges and immunities clause claim as follows: “Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The inquiry must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the principle that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) In the face of a proper substantial reason, there may be constitutionally valid discrimination under the privileges and immunities clause. Toomer further defined the justification that must be present in order for a nonresident’s privileges and immunities clause claim to be rejected as follows, “[T]he purpose of that clause ... is to outlaw classifications based on the fact of non-citizenship unless there is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.” (Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 398 [ 68 S.Ct. at p. 1163 ]; accord, United Building & Constr. Trades v. Mayor (1984) 465 U.S. 208, 222 [ 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1029-1030 , 79 L.Ed.2d 249 ].)
Further, in Saenz , while discussing the privileges and immunities clause aspect of the travel right, the United States Supreme Court cited as an example of allowable discrimination the discussion in Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at page 445 [93 S.Ct. at pages 2232-2233] where it was *296 unquestioned that the State of Connecticut had a right to impose higher college tuition on nonresident students. Later, in Vlandis , the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of discriminatory tuition charges and stated: “Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents, for purposes of tuition and fees, just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis.” (Id. at pp. 452-453 [93 S.Ct. at pp. 2236-2237], fn. omitted.) The omitted footnote in the foregoing quotation from Vlandis cited to the decision of the California Court of Appeal in Kirk v. Regents of University of California (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 430 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]. Kirk concluded a one-year residency requirement before a University of California student could receive reduced tuition rates did not violate the constitutional travel right. (Id. at p. 440.)
Another relevant decision cited in Saenz is Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n, supra, 436 U.S. at pages 390-391 [98 S.Ct. at pages 1863-1864]. Baldwin drew another boundary on a travel right claim arising under the privileges and immunities clause. Baldwin held: “Nor must a State always apply all its laws or all its services equally to anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it so to do. [Citations.] Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.” (Id. at p. 383 [98 S.Ct. at p. 1860].)
The foregoing body of constitutional law leads to the following conclusions concerning a privileges and immunities clause claim arising in the travel right context. The travel right is not absolute. (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 500 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1525 ]; Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 [ 68 S.Ct. at p. 1162 ].) A state may defeat a privileges and immunities clause claim by showing “a substantial reason” for the discriminatory treatment of the person who has left or entered its boundaries. (Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 [ 68 S.Ct. at p. 1162 ]; United Building & Constr. Trades v. Mayor, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 222 [ 104 S.Ct. at p. 1029 ].) Further, states have-“considerable leeway” in determining whether *297 local problems require legislative action. {Landing v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal (1998) 522 U.S. 287, 298 [ 118 S.Ct. 766, 774, 139 L.Ed.2d 717 ]; Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 [ 68 S.Ct. at p. 1162 ].) Moreover, in the higher education context, states may engage in reasonably based discriminatory conduct utilizing residence as a cost or funding factor. (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 500 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1525 ] [privileges and immunities clause and travel right claims]; Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at pp. 452-453 [93 S.Ct. at pp. 2236-2237] [due process clause claim]; Kirk v. Regents of University of California, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d at p. 440 [equal protection claim].) Finally, if a privilege or immunity does not bear on the vitality of the nation, discriminatory treatment against a nonresident may be constitutional. (Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman (1988) 487 U.S. 59, 64-65 [ 108 S.Ct. 2260, 2263-2265 , 101 L.Ed.2d 56 ]; Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 383 [98 S.Ct. at p. 1860].)
Application of these principles demonstrates Labor Code section 4644, subdivision (g) does not violate any travel right premised on the privileges and immunities clause. This case involves funding for college training. The statutory requirement funding limitations imposed on a nonresident are premised on a need to contain spiraling expenditures and an out-of-state vocational rehabilitation program involves higher costs. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 291-292.) The limited cost limitation imposed by Labor Code section 4644, subdivision (g) does not bear on the vitality of the nation; out-of-state residents are still entitled to vocational training, only subject to the narrow limitation resulting from a need to control spiraling workers’ compensation expenditures. Although the issue is close, given the considerable leeway accorded states under our federal system to determine the extent of their funding for higher education, no privileges and immunities clause violation has occurred under the extremely narrow circumstances present in this case.
The third aspect of the travel right identified in Saenz is the right of newly arrived citizens to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other residents of this state. {Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 506-507 [119 S.Ct. at pp. 152-1528].) The present case does not involve a newly arrived resident. In this regard, Saenz is not controlling.
Nonetheless, even if the issue is whether residents of Nevada must be treated exactly the same as those of California, the crucial analysis in Saenz as to this third aspect of the travel right is as follows: “Disavowing any desire to fence out the indigent, California has instead advanced an entirely fiscal justification for its multitiered scheme. The enforcement of [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 11450.03 will save the State approximately $10.9 million a year. The question is not whether such saving is a legitimate *298 purpose but whether the State may accomplish that end by the discriminatory means it has chosen. An evenhanded, across-the-board reduction of about 72 cents per month for every beneficiary would produce the same result. But our negative answer to the question does not rest on the weakness of the State’s purported fiscal justification. It rests on the fact that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with residence: ‘That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based on length of residence.’ [Citation.] It is equally clear that the Clause does not tolerate a hierarchy of 45 subclasses of similarly situated citizens based on the location of their prior residence. Thus [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 11450.03 is doubly vulnerable: Neither the duration of respondents’ California residence, nor the identity of their prior States of residence, has any relevance to their need for benefits. Nor do those factors bear any relationship to the State’s interest in making an equitable allocation of the funds to be distributed among its needy citizens.” (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 506-507 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1528 ],. fn. omitted.)
The present case is materially different from Saenz . Supervision of out-of-state recipients of vocational retraining involves greater costs then those incurred when monitoring retraining inside California. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 292.) This is in contrast to the situation in Saenz where there was no correlation between the duration of the welfare recipient’s California residence, nor the identity of their prior residence and their need for benefits. (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 506-507 [119 S.Ct. at pp. 1527-1528].) Here, the correlation is clear—it costs more for the out-of-state training to be monitored by California officials. Further, this case involves reimbursement for college tuition costs, not payments for “food, clothing and shelter.” (Kirk v. Regents of University of California, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d at p. 440 .) No travel right violation has occurred.
On March 15, 2001, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Petitioner’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 23, 2001.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9750004. Public record. Not legal advice.