# Berks County Tuberculosis Society Appeal

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · April 20, 1965 · 418 Pa. 112

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749981

## Case

- **Full name:** Berks County Tuberculosis Society Appeal
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 20, 1965
- **Citations:** 418 Pa. 112; 208 A.2d 857; 1965 Pa. LEXIS 565
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Cohen
- **Judges:** Bell, Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts
- **Cited by:** 16 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749981

## Opinion text

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen :
The settlor purported to make a gift to “The Tuberculosis Society of Berks County, of Reading, Pennsylvania.” Two parties claim to be the object of the settlor’s charitable intention: Berks County Tuberculosis Society, on the one hand, and Reading-Berks Tuberculosis and Health Association, on the other. While the settlor’s words are clear on their face, the external facts make these words ambiguous. That is, upon application of the settlor’s words to external facts, it is found that they fit two objects equally but neither exactly. Thus, what is called a “latent ambiguity” arises. Logan v. Wiley, 357 Pa. 547 , 55 A. 2d 368 (1947); Metzger’s Estate, 222 Pa. 276 , 71 Atl. 96 (1908); 9 Wigmore on Evidence §2472 (3d ed. 1940). Here, it is the description of the beneficiary that gives rise to the latent ambiguity.
It has long been the rule that “[a]n ambiguity in description may always be explained.” Logan v. Wiley, supra, at p. 551 . How it is to be explained is clearly stated by Metzger’s Estate, supra, at p. 281: “A latent ambiguity can only be developed by extrinsic and collateral circumstances and it is always competent to show that such ambiguity exists. . . . ‘When such latent ambiguity has once been made dehors the will, then the way is open for parol testimony to whatever extent may be necessary to remove it’. . .
*118 Following this principle, the lower court accepted extrinsic evidence to clear up the ambiguity. The majority, however, would make the acceptance of such evidence ground for reversal. If I understand the majority, they state that no ambiguity exists which would require the admission of extrinsic evidence. Yet there is sufficient ambiguity in the majority’s mind to warrant a mechanical and surgical dissection and recomposition of the settlor’s words based upon argumentative and speculative assertions deduced from other phrases of the instrument. I do not understand the law to distinguish between a latent ambiguity which allows the admission of relevant extrinsic evidence and one which allows only the rewriting process engaged in by the majority. Once the latent ambiguity is established, it has been thought that the settlor’s intent will be more readily fulfilled if all the surrounding facts and circumstances are developed. Undoubtedly, it is proper to search the instrument itself for the meaning of ambiguous words, but, in my view, the majority lapses back into the days before Lord Coke when “[i]t was part of the stiff formalism of earlier interpretation . . . that all aids to the meaning must be found in the document itself(Emphasis partially supplied). 9 Wigmore on Evidence §2470 (3d ed. 1940). As Wigmore points out “[e] ven in Coke’s time it was conceded that in case of an equivocation ... or double-meaning description, outside data could be sought. . . .” Id.
The settlor’s intent in this case can only be derived with the aid of extrinsic evidence. I would affirm the lower court and, therefore, I dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749981. Public record. Not legal advice.