# Washington Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commission

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · September 10, 1982 · 450 A.2d 1187

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749675

## Case

- **Full name:** WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT CO., Petitioner, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Respondent, Apartment and Office Building Association of Metropolitan Washington, Inc., Columbia Realty Venture, General Services Administration, and People’s Counsel, Intervenors; GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Respondent, Washington Gas Light Co., and People’s Counsel, Intervenors; APARTMENT AND OFFICE BUILDING ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, INC., and Columbia Realty Venture, Petitioners, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Respondent, Washington Gas Light Co., and People’s Counsel, Intervenors; PEOPLE’S COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Respondent, Washington Gas Light Co., Intervenor
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** September 10, 1982
- **Citations:** 450 A.2d 1187; 1982 D.C. App. LEXIS 433
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Pryor
- **Judges:** Newman, Harris, Pryor
- **Cited by:** 45 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749675

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that agency must make clear that it has considered all relevant information
- affirming ruling that “ ‘the ratepayers may not be required to make forced contributions’ ”

## Opinion text

*1242 PRYOR, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join in the majority opinion affirming the Commission’s Order.
I note, however, that a divided Commission excluded certain expenses claimed by the Company in the areas of advertising, trade and civic association dues, and for community affairs programs. As I read the Order, it does not reject those items as categorically unrelated to the interests of the ratepayer; rather, the rulings rest on the narrower ground that the Company did not carry its burden of proof by merely asserting the claimed expenses. If it is true, as the dissenting Commissioner indicates, that this greater scrutiny is a departure from past practice, then the Commission should — as it indicates in its Order— take the necessary steps to clarify “... the treatment of advertising expenses in the near future.”
Viewing the case as a whole, it is clear that the majority and dissenting opinions, in discussing the numerous issues at length, disagree, at bottom, on the lawful and appropriate role of the Commission in approving and structuring the rates of a public utility. Putting aside the dissenter’s characterizations of the majority’s views, the fundamental question which we have decided is whether the Commission’s Order, innovative though it may be, is within the authority entrusted to it and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. I think the Order passes the statutory test and I therefore vote to affirm.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749675. Public record. Not legal advice.