# Rue v. K-Mart Corp.

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · March 20, 1997 · 456 Pa. Super. 641

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749043

## Case

- **Full name:** Patricia RUE, v. K-MART CORPORATION, Appellant
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 20, 1997
- **Citations:** 456 Pa. Super. 641; 691 A.2d 498; 12 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1195; 1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 570
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Elliott
- **Judges:** Cavanaugh, Cirillo, Popovich, Johnson, Hudock, Elliott, Saylor, Eakin, Schiller
- **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749043

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the public policy considerations undergirding Pennsylvania unemployment compensation law were insufficiently similar to an action for civil defamation

## Opinion text

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion as to the facts before us instantly, I must respectfully dissent as -to that part of the majority’s opinion which attempts to distinguish four cases previously decided by courts of this Commonwealth. I believe that the same policy considerations should apply to any collateral estoppel analysis of either an Unemployment Compensation or a Workers’ Compensation determination.
Following the analysis of our supreme court in Odgers v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 514 Pa. 378 , 525 A.2d 359 (1987), the majority thoroughly examines the public policy underlying the Unemployment Compensation Law. The majority then compares that policy with the public policy behind the common law of defamation. In so doing, the majority appropriately observes that the Unemployment Compensation Law is intended to afford claimants a “fast and informal” procedure by which to determine their eligibility for benefits. (Majority opinion at 644, 691 A.2d at 499.) As a result, according to the majority, the unemployment compensation referee’s determination that K-Mart’s employee, Ms. *665 Rue, appellee herein, did not steal a bag of potato chips should not preclude K-Mart from raising as a defense to defamation its claim that the same employee did in fact steal the bag of chips. According to the majority, the goal of affording prompt payment of unemployment benefits to employees who have lost their own would be thwarted if employers felt compelled fully to litigate the referee’s factual findings as if they were defending a civil suit. (Majority opinion at 651-60, 691 A.2d at 503-07, quoting Swineford v. Snyder County, Pa., 15 F.3d 1258 , 1269 (3d Cir.1994), and Verbilla v. W.C.A.B. (Schuylkill Nursing Ass’n.), 668 A.2d 601 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995).) I agree.
Additionally, I agree with the majority that the procedures utilized during an unemployment compensation hearing do not afford the parties the sort of opportunity fully and finally to litigate either factual or legal issues required under Pennsylvania’s four-part test for determining whether issue preclusion is appropriate. (Majority opinion at 645-48, 691 A.2d at 500-01, citing Bortz v. W.C.A.B., 546 Pa. 77, 82 , 683 A.2d 259, 261 (1996); majority opinion at 505, quoting Verbilla, supra.)
I disagree, however, with the majority’s assertion that “our ruling today does not conflict with other decisions of the courts of this Commonwealth which hold that decisions of administrative agencies can enjoy preclusive effect in a civil action or in another administrative proceeding.” (Majority opinion at 660, 691 A.2d at 507, citing Capobianchi v. BIC Corp., 446 Pa.Super. 130 , 666 A.2d 344 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 599 , 674 A.2d 1065 (1996); Christopher v. Council of Plymouth Township, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 670 , 635 A.2d 749 (1993); McCullough v. Xerox Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 135 , 581 A.2d 961 (1990), allocatur denied,, 527 Pa. 624 , 592 A.2d 45 (1991); and Grant v.GAF Corp., 415 Pa.Super. 137 , 608 A.2d 1047 (1992), affirmed, 536 Pa. 429 , 639 A.2d 1170 (1994).) My reasons for disagreement follow.
First, I must disagree with the majority’s rationale for distinguishing these four cases. The majority opines that “if the employee [in the four cases cited supra ] cannot meet the *666 lesser burden of proof required in the workmen’s [sic] 1 compensation action, then he should not be given another opportunity to prevail in a civil action.” (Majority opinion at 660, 691 A.2d at 507.) The identical argument could, however, be raised instantly: Ms. Rue could argue that K-Mart, having failed to meet the lesser burden of proof to deny her benefits in the unemployment compensation action, should not be given another opportunity to prevail in a civil action. We cannot, in fairness, hold employees to a higher standard than we hold employers. Rather, if we conclude that an employer does not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate in an administrative hearing, we must likewise conclude that an employee lacks the same opportunity.
I must also disagree with the majority’s characterization of a workers’ compensation hearing as more closely akin procedurally to a civil action than to an unemployment compensation hearing. (Majority opinion at 659, 691 A.2d at 507.) See Anzaldo v. W.C.A.B. M & M Restaurant Supply Co., 667 A.2d 488, 493 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (holding that the Workmen’s Compensation Act section [§ 834], which states that neither the board nor the referee shall be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence in conducting a hearing or investigation, but all findings of fact shall be based upon sufficient competent evidence, permits an information-gathering process which favors admitting all offered evidence into the record), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 676 , 678 A.2d 366 (1996); Liberty Baking Co. v. Com., W.C.A.B., 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 517 , , 439 A.2d 1276, 1279 (1981) (holding that the rules governing pleading in a workmen’s compensation case do not mirror the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, and that pleadings in compensation cases should be liberally construed).
Likewise, I cannot agree with the distinction drawn by the majority between an unemployment compensation board, which, I agree, is intended to be a forum for quick resolution of an employee’s claim in order to avoid financial hardship, and a workers’ compensation board, which, similarly, is intend *667 ed to provide a forum for quick resolution of an injured employee’s claim, without resorting to litigation.
Finally, I must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that permitting relitigation of an occupational injury in a common law tort action would undermine the concept of workers’ compensation as the sole and exclusive means for recovery against an employer. (Majority opinion at 659-60, 691 A.2d at 507.) The validity of this argument is predicated on the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 481, not on the doctrine of collateral estoppel; an employer sued in tort by an employee can simply raise § 481 as a defense. 2
I recognize that the issue of whether to afford preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action to the findings of fact of a workers’ compensation referee is not properly before us today. To that extent, this court’s discussion of the four workers’ compensation cases is mere obiter dicta. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 543 Pa. 628 , -, 674 A.2d 214, 217 (1996), quoting In re Kenin’s Trust Estate, 343 Pa. 549 , 23 A.2d 837 (1942) (“ ‘in every case, what is actually decided is the law applicable to the particular facts; all other conclusions are but obiter dicta’ ”). Nevertheless, I am convinced that the broad policy concerns at issue instantly, which require our holding today that findings during administrative hearings do not preclude relitigation in subsequent common law actions on separate claims, are indistinguishable from the policy concerns at issue in those workers’ compensation cases discussed by the majority. As a result, given the opportunity, I would overrule the cases from this court to the extent that they applied collateral estoppel.
*668 For all of the foregoing reasons, I concur in that part of the majority’s opinion in which preclusive effect is denied to the unemployment compensation referee’s findings of fact. I must respectfully dissent, however, insofar as the majority attempts to distinguish the instant case from those workers’ compensation cases discussed supra. I believe the same analysis should apply.
. The name of this Act was changed in 1993 to Workers ' Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 1, July 2, P.L. 190, No. 44, § 1.
. I would further state my specific disagreement with this court's decisions in Capobianchi, supra, and Grant, supra, in which an employee or his estate brought a common law tort action against a third party manufacturer of a product, not against the employer. In both cases, this court held that the workers' compensation referee's determination that the injuries were not caused by an occurrence or condition at the work place precluded the employees from litigating the cause of their injuries in a tort action against the manufacturer of the product alleged to have caused the injury. I would suggest that our holding today should apply with equal force under the facts of Capobianchi, supra, and Grant, supra.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9749043. Public record. Not legal advice.