# Berman v. Sitrin

> Supreme Court of Rhode Island · April 20, 2010 · 991 A.2d 1038

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9748232

## Case

- **Full name:** Simcha BERMAN Et Al. v. Laura SITRIN, in Her Capacity as Finance Director for the City of Newport Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Rhode Island
- **Decided:** April 20, 2010
- **Citations:** 991 A.2d 1038; 2010 R.I. LEXIS 45; 2010 WL 1555365
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Flaherty
- **Judges:** Suttell, Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, Williams
- **Cited by:** 52 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9748232

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the City of Newport was not protected by the RUS where it had notice of a dangerous condition based on prior reported incidents of death and serious injury
- describing Verity as recognizing an “exception” to the public duty doctrine “when the governmental entity acts in an egregious manner”
- finding no duty on the part of the defendant, owner of property over which public easement runs, for injuries to user of easement where the defendant had no control over easement

## Opinion text

FLAHERTY, J.,
concurring.
I completely concur in Justice Goldberg’s well-written opinion that the Recreational Use Statute, G.L. 1956 chapter 6 of title 32, effectively bars suit in this *1054 case against the Preservation Society of Newport but does not do so against the City of Newport. To hold otherwise would require this Court to embrace a conclusion that the landowner, saturated with the knowledge that some feature of his land presents a clear and present danger to completely innocent users, simply could adopt a “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” attitude and use the statute as a shield from liability. I cannot begin to conceive that the General Assembly had any such intent; to conclude otherwise would be beyond absurd. See Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I.1991) (“[E]ven in circumstances in which a statute is clear and unambiguous, a statute will not be interpreted literally when such a construction will lead to an absurd result or one at odds with the legislative intent.”); Sugarman v. Lewis, 488 A.2d 709, 711 (R.I.1985) (“A statute should not be interpreted literally, however, even though clear and unambiguous, when such a construction will lead to a result at odds with the legislative intent.”); Kingsley v. Miller, 120 R.I. 372, 376 , 388 A.2d 357, 360 (1978) (“[A] literal reading of a statute may be ignored if it does not convey a sensible meaning or where it defeats an evident legislative purpose.”). A contrary holding in this case would provide an incentive to landowners to be callous and altogether irresponsible with respect to the safety of people entering upon their land for simple recreational pleasure, in the face of danger known to the owner, but of which the recreational user is totally unaware.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9748232. Public record. Not legal advice.