# Veney v. United States > District of Columbia Court of Appeals · July 25, 1996 · 681 A.2d 428 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9747398 ## Case - **Full name:** Tycho VENEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee - **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals - **Decided:** July 25, 1996 - **Citations:** 681 A.2d 428; 1996 D.C. App. LEXIS 145; 1996 WL 414179 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Reid - **Judges:** Wagner, Ferren, Terry, Steadman, Schwelb, Farrell, King, Ruiz, Reid - **Cited by:** 19 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9747398 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that even if a defendant is eligible for a YRA sentence, “an adult sentence may [nevertheless] be imposed if the record reflects that the [sentencing] judge was aware of the availability under the Act of youth offender treatment, that he considered that rehabilitati… - holding “an adult sentence may be imposed if the record reflects the judge was aware of the availability under the Act of youth offender treatment, that he considered the rehabilitative option, and that he rejected it” ## Opinion text REID, Associate Judge, joined by RUIZ, Associate Judge, concurring in the judgment: The majority holds that: “[AJn adult sentence may be imposed if the record reflects that the judge was aware of the availability under the Act of youth offender treatment, that he considered that rehabilitative option, and that he rejected it.” The dissent would remand the case for resentencing on the ground that: “[T]he trial judge’s ruling did not meet [the following] test[:]” “[B]efore denying treatment of an eligible youth offender under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA) ..., the trial judge must make an explicit ‘no benefit’ finding, as was required under the former Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA) interpreted in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 , 94 S.Ct. 3042 , 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974).” While we agree that the judgment should be affirmed, we respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of D.C.Code § 24-803(d). The word “considered” is not equivalent to “an express finding of no benefit ... made on the record_” Id. at 425-26, 94 S.Ct. at 3044 . We also reject the majority’s reading of § 24 — 803(f) in that it eviscerates the substance of §§ 24-803(c) and (d). Although we are more inclined toward the dissent’s interpretation of § 24-803(d), we disagree with the conclusion that: “an explicit ‘no benefit’ finding” is required. (Emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Dorszyn-ski did not use the word “explicit.” Rather, it chose the word “express”: ‘We conclude that while an express finding of no benefit must be made on the record, the Act does not require that it be accompanied by supporting reasons.” 418 U.S. at 425-26 , 94 S.Ct. at 3044 (emphasis added). We believe that, as used by the dissent, the word “explicit” demands more than does the word “express” in the context of Dorszynski . The dissent in the division opinion in Veney, which is incorporated in the dissent here, seems to require the record to “unmistakably [show]” that no benefit would result to the defendant from youth offender treatment. Veney v. United States, 658 A.2d 625, 644 (D.C.1995). The trial judge would have to use “words that can only be construed to mean ‘no benefit.’ ” Id. at 646 . An example of an “unmistakable showing” would be the [“incorporation of] an expert report or finding that showed that Veney would not gain from YRA sentencing.” Id. at 645 . Another example would be the use of the exact statutory words. Id. at 646 . When Dorszynski is read as a whole, the type of precision the dissent requires cannot be found. The purpose of the “express no benefit finding” is “to insure that the sentencing judge exercised his discretion in choosing not to commit a youth offender to treatment under the Act.” 418 U.S. at 443 , 94 S.Ct. at 3052 . Moreover, the “express no benefit finding” is “not to be read as a substantive standard.... [and] the Act does not require that it be accompanied by supporting reasons.” Id. at 441 , 94 S.Ct. at 3052 . Hence, we conclude that before denying YRA treatment, the trial judge must make an express finding of no benefit on the record, but the Act does not require the finding to be accompanied by supporting reasons. It is sufficient if the record reveals that the trial judge has exercised his discretion and decided that the youth will derive no benefit from YRA treatment. The record of Veney’s March 16, 1993, sentencing reveals that the trial judge exercised his discretion and decided that Veney would not benefit from YRA treatment. We agree with the dissent that “rehabilitation and community safety are two sides of the *439 same coin”, and that: “The judge is authorized to find ‘no benefit’ if the youth’s prospects for rehabilitation, through YRA treatment, are unlikely to assure community safety upon his release.” Here, the trial judge concluded that Veney’s prospects for rehabilitation, through YRA treatment, would be unlikely to assure community safety upon his release. This is what he obviously meant in making the statement:' “And although I don’t think it would be a very wise decision for them [i.e., YRA authorities] to release you earlier than you would be released as an adult [,][u]ltimately, the Court doesn’t have any control over it.” The trial judge clearly regarded the case as “difficult.” Nonetheless, he exercised his discretion, reached a decision and made an express finding of “no benefit” after weighing evidence before him and arguments made concerning Veney’s mental age, his psychological and emotional problems, and his dangerousness. The sentencing record reveals that the trial judge regarded Veney’s dangerousness as extending beyond his one heinous act of manslaughter while armed, as manifested by the following on the record statement: I can’t overlook the fact that you have been carrying around a gun for a while and I cannot assure myself that you only had that gun for Mr. Locus, because of something that he had done to you, as opposed to having that gun for its general use whenever you felt it happened to be needed. The trial judge listened to the arguments of Veney’s counsel that there was a danger of his victimization at Lorton, that he would have more supervision at the Youth Center than Lorton. He also heard the arguments of the government that it was not clear whether in practice, as opposed to theory, Veney would receive better psychiatric counseling at Lorton than the Youth Center. After weighing Veney’s background, his dangerousness to the community, and whether he would receive better psychiatric counseling at Lorton or at the Youth Center, the record reveals that the trial judge exercised his discretion by deciding that Veney would not benefit from YRA treatment because his prospects for rehabilitation through the YRA program were unlikely to assure community safety upon his release. No incantation or recitation of the words “no benefit” was necessary so long as the sentencing record reveals that the trial judge made an express finding of no benefit. On the record before us, we believe that the requisite finding was made. Therefore, we concur that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9747398. Public record. Not legal advice.