# Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · September 22, 1980 · 491 Pa. 561 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9746706 ## Case - **Full name:** Theodore KACZKOWSKI, Administrator of the Estate of Eric K. Kaczkowski, Deceased, on Behalf of the Estate of Eric K. Kaczkowski, Deceased, Appellant, v. John J. BOLUBASZ, Appellee - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** September 22, 1980 - **Citations:** 491 Pa. 561; 421 A.2d 1027; 21 A.L.R. 4th 1; 1980 Pa. LEXIS 802 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Roberts - **Judges:** Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman - **Cited by:** 152 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9746706 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “predicting lost future earnings entails some degree of speculation[; h]owever, that alone does not justify excluding reliable economic evidence since imprecision is inherent in any computation of lost future benefits” - holding that courts shall consider the victim’s lost future productivity and that “future inflation shall be presumed equal to future interest rates with these factors offsetting.” - holding that practice of discounting future lost earnings would be abandoned so as to offset effects of future inflation ## Opinion text ROBERTS, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority that the practice of reducing to present value the lost future earnings component of personal injury awards should be abrogated and the “total offset” rule adopted in its stead. The practice of reducing to present value is unrealistic in its failure to take into account either future inflation or deflation. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 913A Comment at p. 492 (1979). Though perhaps somewhat imprecise, the total offset rule will fairly accommodate parties in both inflationary and deflationary times. So too, the total offset rule “has administrative simplicity to recommend it, since it avoids rather complex calculations involved in reducing to present value.” D. Dobbs, Remedies § 8.7 at p. 575 (1973). Indeed, any person who has heard a court’s “present value” charge will attest to the wisdom of abrogating the practice. See Brodie v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 296 , 203 A.2d 657 (1964). I also agree with the majority that a jury may consider evidence of a victim’s lost future earning increases. It is my understanding, however, that Pennsylvania law has long permitted jury consideration both of earning decreases and of earning increases. For example, Proposed Jury Instruction 6.22 (Civil) on “Earnings Fluctuations” provides: *585 Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions Subcommittee Draft October 14, 1973. See also e.g., McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561 , 132 A. 810 (1926), overruled on other grounds, Brodie v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., supra; Robert M. Bernstein, “Damages in Personal Injury and Death Cases in Pennsylvania,” 23 Pa. Bar Ass’n Q. 9 (1951). *584 “If you find that the plaintiff will suffer an impairment or loss of earning power as the result of this accident . . ., you may take into consideration possible fluctuations with respect to such losses. In other words, if you find that the plaintiff’s . .. wages would have increased or decreased over the years, you will take that factor into consideration so that proper compensation can be made.” *585 It should also be observed that today’s result does not mandate jury verdicts reflecting only earning increases. Within accepted rules of evidence, both sides are free to offer competent and relevant proof to establish their respective positions as well as to challenge the evidence offered in opposition. Finally, today’s result does not represent the exclusive means of taking future economic factors into account in cases of larger damage awards covering losses over future years. For example, special findings of fact may be helpful in making certain that neither the tortfeasor not the injured is unduly prejudiced or benefited by future economic conditions. Also, at least thirteen states, including California, Delaware, Florida, and Maryland, have enacted laws allowing for some form of periodic payments in medical malpractice actions. See T. Elligett, “The Periodic Payment of Judgments,” 46 Ins. Counsel J. 130, 134 n.49 (1979). Very recently the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted an approved draft of a “Uniform Periodic Payment of Judgments Act” which authorizes installment payment of awards in personal injury cases. See generally Roger C. Henderson, “Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards,” 66 A.B.A.J. 734 (1980). Installment payment provisions of the uniform act “eliminate[ ] the guesswork and speculation involved in the lump-sum system when the jury is asked to discount awards of future damages to present value and, in an increasing number of jurisdictions, predict future rates of inflation. Since damages will be paid as losses accrue, there is no need to discount to present value. With regard to inflation, the act provides for adjustments in the unpaid *586 installments so that the damages award is not eroded by inflation.” Id. at 736. Appropriate common-law approaches, including special findings, installment payments, and the like, may, of course, be fashioned to assure that full and real effect is given to the adjudication of liability and damages. See e.g., Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 438 , 388 A.2d 730, 734-35 (1978); W. Schaefer, “Precedent and Policy,” 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 3 (1966). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9746706. Public record. Not legal advice.