# In Re Appeal of Larsen

> United States Special Tribunals of Pennsylvania · October 24, 2002 · 571 Pa. 457

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9746202

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re Appeal of Rolf LARSEN, Appellant
- **Court:** United States Special Tribunals of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 24, 2002
- **Citations:** 571 Pa. 457; 812 A.2d 640
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens
- **Judges:** Hudock, Elliott, Friedman, Stevens, Todd, Klein, Bowes
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9746202

## Opinion text

Concurring opinion
by STEVENS J.
I concur in the result reached in the well-reasoned Majority Opinion. However, I respectfully do not join the Majority’s conclusion that “the specific and explicit power granted to the Supreme Court by Article V, Section 10 to control the practice of law must be viewed as precluding the use of disbarment as a sanction by any tribunal other than the Supreme Court itself.” I conclude that this statement is not supported by Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jepsen, 567 Pa. 459 , 787 A.2d 420 (2002).
Jepsen indicates that, at the very least, both the Court of Judicial Discipline and the Supreme Court possess the authority to disbar judicial officers. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that “both [the Disciplinary Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline] possess constitutionally conferred authority to entertain charges filed against a judicial officer who commits misconduct during the practice of law. Each tribunal is likewise capable of determining the appropriate discipline.” Jepsen, 567 Pa. at 464 , 787 A.2d at 423 . Specifically noteworthy is the fact that the Supreme Court in Jepsen never explicitly stated that it was the exclusive tribunal for disbarment sanctions. I believe that if the Supreme Court intended such a conclusion, it would have specifically so indicated.
Thus, while I agree with the remainder of the Majority’s Opinion, I do not agree with the Majority’s interpretation of Jepsen . Specifically, I disagree that Jepsen precludes disbar *486 ment as a sanction available to the Court of Judicial Discipline. 1
. I did not review the merits of whether former Justice Larsen received a fair hearing as I believe that issue is beyond the scope of our authority.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9746202. Public record. Not legal advice.