# People v. Palmer

> Illinois Supreme Court · October 20, 1994 · 162 Ill. 2d 465

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9745780

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LESLIE PALMER, Appellant
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 20, 1994
- **Citations:** 162 Ill. 2d 465; 205 Ill. Dec. 506; 643 N.E.2d 797; 1994 Ill. LEXIS 143
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Harrison
- **Judges:** Freeman, Harrison, McMorrow
- **Cited by:** 277 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9745780

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the same with respect to guilty pleas
- finding that proof of prejudice cannot be based on conjecture or speculation
- noting that mere errors in trial strategy does not establish incompetence, “ ‘even if [this judgement is shown to be] clearly wrong in retrospect’ ”

## Opinion text

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Although the majority correctly states Strickland’s two-part test for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, it forgets that these principles are not intended to be mechanical rules. According to the United States Supreme Court,
"the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
During the guilt phase of this case, the breakdown of the adversarial process was total. At the time defendant pleaded guilty, his attorney had completely abandoned his responsibilities as an advocate. When counsel urged defendant to waive a trial without first attempting to obtain a concession on sentencing, the only interests he served were those of the State’s Attorney, whose office he had once held. There was no possible benefit to his client.
Where an attorney believes that his client’s best chance lies with a trial on the merits, there may be legitimate reasons for forgoing plea negotiations. Where, however, counsel recommends that a client facing the death penalty forgo a trial, the failure to even explore the possibility of negotiating concessions can never be justified.
No matter how strong the evidence or how weak the possible defenses, every defendant has at least one bargaining point — the plea itself. (Cole v. Slayton (W.D. Va. 1974), 378 F. Supp. 364, 368 .) There are always legitimate reasons the State may offer to negotiate for that plea, e.g., saving the cost of trial, increasing efficiency in achieving convictions, and providing further flexibility in the criminal process. (People v. Brown (1986), 177 Cal. App. 3d 537, 546 , 223 Cal. Rptr. 66, 71 .) Although the State may refuse to agree to concessions in a particular case, a defendant in a capital case has nothing to lose by asking and everything to gain. It may spare his life. This is a concept even the most inexperienced lawyer should surely be able to grasp.
In rejecting defendant’s claim, the majority asserts that the prejudice to him is too speculative. (162 Ill. 2d at 481.) Such an assertion is meritless. To prove actual prejudice, a defendant need only show that a "reasonable probability” exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. A "reasonable probability” is not a certainty. It is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
This threshold was met here. There is no dispute that the State offered the codefendant a plea agreement which would have eliminated the possibility of a death sentence. Given that the codefendant was the one who actually inflicted the mortal wound, there is every reason to believe that defendant could have secured terms which were every bit as good, if not better. The majority gives no reason for concluding otherwise.
As an alternative basis for its decision, the majority excuses counsel’s recommendation to enter a blind plea on the grounds that it was a matter of trial strategy. This contention must also fail. A strategy is a "careful plan or method.” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2256 (1986).) Counsel’s advice here was anything but that. It was not based on any past experience, special knowledge, or clever insight. There was no more reason behind it than buying a chance at the lottery. In effect, counsel was asking his client to close his eyes, cross his fingers, and hope for the best. Defendant could have done as well had he simply consulted the horoscope in the morning paper.
If advice like this is all the sixth amendment requires, as the majority holds today, the right to counsel is an empty promise. I believe the Constitution requires more. I therefore dissent.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9745780. Public record. Not legal advice.