# People v. Hickey > Illinois Supreme Court · September 27, 2001 · 204 Ill. 2d 585 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9744516 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ARTHUR DALE HICKEY, Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** September 27, 2001 - **Citations:** 204 Ill. 2d 585; 275 Ill. Dec. 1; 792 N.E.2d 232; 2001 Ill. LEXIS 1080 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Kilbride - **Judges:** Thomas, Harrison, Kilbride - **Cited by:** 49 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9744516 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding that violations of criminal rules of procedure do not necessarily warrant post-conviction relief, as safeguards in rules of procedure are broader than the constitutional rights they protect - stating that the discovery rules “shall be applied in all criminal cases wherein the accused is charged with a felony” - holding that the new Illinois Supreme Court rules regarding capital sentences do not apply retroactively - concluding that new supreme court rules did not fall under the “watershed rule[s]” exception of Teague ## Opinion text JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting: I agree with Chief Justice Harrison’s conclusion that the new supreme court rules governing capital cases should be applied retroactively. Like many other capital convictions tried under the old rules, defendant’s conviction in this case remains suspect because it was obtained through procedures that were inherently unreliable and did not adequately protect a defendant’s constitutional rights. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 714, Committee Comments, at cxiii (acknowledging “problem” in capital trials under old system and the need to safeguard fairness and accuracy). In remedying this monumental wrong, the new rules establish a watershed rule of criminal procedure (see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 , 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356-57 , 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1076 (1989)), particularly with regard to the new mandatory minimum eligibility standards established by Rule 714 for the Capital Litigation Trial Bar (see 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 714(a) through (g)). While imposing substantial standards on capital attorneys, Rule 714, on its face, provides no exception to these standards for defendants who choose to represent themselves. As a result, Rule 714 implicitly eliminates a defendant’s right to proceed pro se in a capital trial, effectively overruling People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995), on that point. For this reason alone, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the new rules are of significant constitutional dimension. Moreover, by imposing minimum standards on capital attorneys and establishing other procedural safeguards for capital cases, the new rules implicate the fundamental fairness and the accuracy of a trial, thus necessitating retroactive application. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12 , 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356-57 , 109 S. Ct. at 1076 ; People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997); People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990). Those who disagree with my conclusion will undoubtedly argue that Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 , 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), afforded all defendants the right to proceed at trial without counsel. Faretta did not, however, decide whether .the right of self-representation applies to capital defendants. In fact, Faretta was decided in 1975 when the death penalty was unconstitutional. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 , 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972). Thus, I disagree that we are constrained by Faretta to hold that capital defendants possess a federal constitutional right to self-representation. See People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 287 (2001) (while bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, we are not bound to extend those decisions to issues not specifically decided). More importantly, a broadening of the Faretta right to encompass capital defendants is fundamentally at odds with the stated purpose of the new rules of assuring the accuracy and fairness of capital trials. The problems pro se defendants pose to the accuracy of trials were partially articulated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 , 77 L. Ed. 158, 170 , 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932): “Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [has] a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.” Therefore, in view of the significant number of capital defendants who have been defended with the assistance of counsel and erroneously convicted, I cannot countenance the notion that a pro se capital defense is sufficiently competent in the face of the most serious proceeding in our criminal justice system. In rejecting the conclusion that the new rules should apply retroactively, the majority partially relies upon a curious rationale, namely, that to accept Chief Justice Harrison’s view would mean that the simple “adherence to the new rules would preclude post-conviction relief because a defendant could not show a constitutional violation.” 204 Ill. 2d at 626. The majority incorrectly assumes this conclusion to be a natural extension of Chief Justice Harrison’s view that nonadherence to the new rules is a per se constitutional violation. As the committee comments indicate, the new rules were designed to minimize, not eliminate, the occurrence of errors. 188 Ill. 2d R. 416, Committee Comments, at lxxii. Plainly put, adherence to the new rules will not result in the trial of every capital case occurring without constitutional error. Unfortunately, errors of constitutional dimension will continue to occur, including the types alleged to have occurred in this case. Therefore, under Chief Justice Harrison’s view of the new rules, post-conviction petitions would continue to be a viable means for aggrieved defendants to bring to light alleged violations of their constitutional rights. At a bare minimum, the resolution of the retroactivity issue should have been more fully addressed by this court following the submission of supplemental briefs on the issue. If we are to err, we should err on the side of caution. Unless we are confident that a capital defendant, or any defendant for that matter, has received a fair trial with competent counsel, we should not proceed without being fully apprised of the applicable legal arguments. Our sense of decency as a humane society demands no less than prudence in the face of the ultimate criminal penalty of death. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. Through this dissent, I express no opinion regarding the propriety of the death penalty, nor do I express any opinion in relation to the other issues raised by Chief Justice Harrison’s dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9744516. Public record. Not legal advice.