# Clancy v. State

> Indiana Court of Appeals · June 15, 2005 · 829 N.E.2d 203

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9744284

## Case

- **Full name:** Timothy J. CLANCY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
- **Court:** Indiana Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** June 15, 2005
- **Citations:** 829 N.E.2d 203; 2005 Ind. App. LEXIS 1100; 2005 WL 1398630
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Darden
- **Judges:** Barnes, Darden
- **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9744284

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “proof that an automobile accident ‘arose out of the inadvertence, lack of attention, forgetfulness or thoughtfulness of the driver of a vehicle, or from an error of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 4 of …
- concluding that even if testimony regarding defendants failure to contact police officer was Fifth Amendment violation, trial court's admonishment to jury cured any error
- applying rule under the Guest Statute to criminal recklessness case involving driver who fell asleep at the wheel and declining to adopt a lesser standard of proof in the criminal context than is required in the civil context
- reversing conviction as merely falling asleep at the wheel without evidence of consciously disregarding a substantial risk is not enough to prove recklessness

## Opinion text

*213 DARDEN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to Issues I, III, and IV. With respect to Issue II, I respectfully dissent.
It has long been the law in Indiana that criminal statutes are "strictly construed against the State." Sunday v. State, 720 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Ind.1999); see also e.g., Fahnestock v. State, 102 Ind. 156 , 1 N.E. 872 , 877 (1885). We look to the "plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the language unless the statute itself provides a contrary meaning." Sunday, 720 N.E.2d at 718 .
The statute defines the offense of false informing as the giving of "false information in the official investigation of the commission of a crime, knowing the information to be false." Ind.Code § 35-44-2-2(d)(a). Thus, as I read the statute, the law enforcement officer must have been conducting "an official investigation of the commission of a crime" in order for the provision of "false information" to constitute the offense. Id. Here, the record indicates that the responding officers were investigating an accident and had no indi-cia of criminal activity at the time Claney was questioned. Because the officer was not conducting an "official investigation of the commission of a crime" at the time Clancy informed the officer that Joshua was driving, I would reverse Clancy's conviction in that regard.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9744284. Public record. Not legal advice.