# People v. Eickhoff

> Appellate Court of Illinois · November 30, 1984 · 129 Ill. App. 3d 99

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9743192

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN H. EICKHOFF, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** November 30, 1984
- **Citations:** 129 Ill. App. 3d 99; 84 Ill. Dec. 300; 471 N.E.2d 1066; 1984 Ill. App. LEXIS 2551
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Miller
- **Judges:** Trapp, Miller
- **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9743192

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the results of a polygraph test are inadmissible at trial and therefore the refusal to take the polygraph test is also inadmissible

## Opinion text

JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority’s decision to exclude from evidence the defendant’s inculpatory statement, which he made in refusing to take a polygraph test. I specially concur, however, to stress the narrow factual grounds that in my opinion compel that result.
Polygraph evidence is inadmissible primarily because the test is not sufficiently accurate or reliable. (People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225 , 430 N.E.2d 1070 .) Therefore, evidence of a defendant’s offer or refusal to take a polygraph test is inadmissible; the offer or refusal to take an inaccurate, unreliable test is not relevant evidence of a defendant’s innocence or guilt, and evidence of a refusal could lead the trier of fact to draw the unwarranted inference that the defendant declined the test because he is guilty. See Kaske v. City of Rockford (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 298 , 450 N.E.2d 314 (results of polygraph tests are not admissible in disciplinary proceedings before a board of fire and police commissioners, and the refusal to take a polygraph test cannot be grounds for disciplinary action).
The evidence at issue here is not the defendant’s refusal to take a polygraph test but rather the inculpatory statement that he made in the course of explaining his refusal. Inculpatory statements need not be automatically excluded from evidence merely because they have some connection with polygraph tests or mention the subject. (See Duonnolo v. State (Del. 1978), 397 A.2d 126, 132 (fellow prisoner properly allowed to testify about the defendant’s incriminating statement, which touched on his refusal to take a polygraph test).) In an appropriate case, an instruction could be used to make clear to the jury the distinction between the defendant’s inculpatory statement-direct, relevant evidence of guilt — and the context in which it was made. But when the prejudice arising from the reference to the polygraph test and the defendant’s refusal to take it outweighs the probative value of the statement itself, then the statement should be excluded.
A meaningful redaction of the defendant’s statement here would invite, if not require, extensive references to polygraph tests and the defendant’s refusal to take one. The defendant initially gave or assented to three separate reasons — ill feelings toward the investigating officer, guilt of the offense, and distrust of the examination — for refusing to take a polygraph test, but after some hesitation he retracted one of them, that concerning his guilt. I am concerned that the defendant’s apparently offhanded admission, which he quickly disavowed, could not be extracted successfully from its prejudicial context. Therefore, I agree with the majority’s decision to exclude the inculpatory statement.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9743192. Public record. Not legal advice.