# Prior v. GTE North Inc.

> Indiana Court of Appeals · June 30, 1997 · 681 N.E.2d 768

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742837

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert PRIOR, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. GTE NORTH INCORPORATED, Appellee-Defendant
- **Court:** Indiana Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** June 30, 1997
- **Citations:** 681 N.E.2d 768; 1997 Ind. App. LEXIS 777; 1997 WL 359265
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Sullivan
- **Judges:** Baker, Sullivan, Kirsch
- **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742837

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the scope of the IURC’s regulatory authority

## Opinion text

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
Judge Kirsch’s dissent provides occasion for pause with regard to the wisdom of the policy considerations here involved and with respect to the tension between the laudable economic policy which leads us to validate the tariff limitation of liability and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
More particularly, I am amenable to the dissent’s statement that “Immunities and limitations on liability may make good economics, but good economics do not necessarily make good law.” Op. at 777. I am also in agreement that our analysis would seem to validate a hypothetical “limitation on the utility’s liability for an employee’s negligence in driving a repair truck resulting in serious injury or for an installer’s negligence in wiring a customer’s house resulting in a deadly fire.” Id.
Be that as it may, and notwithstanding valid criticism which might be levied against earlier decisions, I am led to my concurrence by those prior legal pronouncements which I consider clearly applicable to the case before us. Despite the well reasoned opinion in Martin v. Richey (1997) Ind.App., 674 N.E.2d 1015 , the decisions from our Supreme Court, though not specifically dealing with the “occurrence” vs. “discovery” aspect of the limitation, have upheld the constitutionality of the medical malpractice statute of limitations as against challenges based upon Article 1, Section 12 of our constitution. Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner (1980) Ind., 274 Ind. 661 , 413 N.E.2d 891 ; Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. (1980) 273 Ind. 374 , 404 N.E.2d 585 . Furthermore, at least one other case, though not involving a due process challenge, has, upon policy grounds, validated the statute as an “occurrence” limitation. Havens v. Ritchey (1991) Ind., 582 N.E.2d 792 . I believe those decisions lead to an analogous result in the case before us. See Ledbetter v. Hunter (1995) Ind.App., 652 N.E.2d 543 (limitation upon malpractice claim of minor not a violation of due process in light of Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.). But see Alwood v. Davis (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (“We have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.”)
It may well be that our Supreme Court should and will revisit the issues presented both by this ease and by Martin v. Richey, supra. Until such time, however, the latitude afforded such policy determinations by the legislature or by administrative rules or regulations must receive our deference. For this reason I concur in affirmance of the summary judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742837. Public record. Not legal advice.