# Jenkins v. AMERICAN EXPRESS FINANCIAL CORP.

> Court of Appeals of Minnesota · September 6, 2005 · 702 N.W.2d 908

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742195

## Case

- **Full name:** Cassandra J. JENKINS, Relator, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Minnesota
- **Decided:** September 6, 2005
- **Citations:** 702 N.W.2d 908; 2005 Minn. App. LEXIS 745; 2005 WL 2129294
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stoneburner
- **Judges:** Peterson, Halbrooks, Stoneburner
- **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742195

## Opinion text

STONEBURNER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that failure of an employer to verify employment, which prevented relator from exercising work-release privileges granted by a district court, constitutes employee misconduct.
A defendant who is sentenced to a term in a county jail, workhouse or “lockup” may be permitted work-release privileges, within the judge’s discretion. Minn.Stat. § 631.425, subd. 2 (2002). If a defendant granted work release has been regularly employed, “the sheriff shall arrange for a continuation of the employment insofar as possible without interruption.” Minn.Stat. § 631.425, subd. 3 (2002). “[T]he purpose of work release is to allow continued or new employment, which can benefit not only (or even primarily) a defendant but the inmate’s family, a victim owed restitution, a court, and society generally....” 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice § 36.13 (3d ed.2001).
The ULJ held that relator’s employer was not obligated to call and verify relator’s employment. But the record does not support the assertion that the employer was required to place a call, only that the employer, who was called, had to verify employment. Although the record is not well developed because the employer did not take part in the hearing, it appears that the employer was only asked to place *915 a call because the employer failed to answer calls made on relator’s behalf.
Respondent argues that an employer has no duty “to participate in work release” and that because relator is responsible for the act that resulted in her being sentenced, and her sentence resulted in her being unavailable for work, she has committed misconduct and is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. But the work-release statute does not involve any “participation” by an employer in work release. A defendant is either employed or not employed when granted work release. An employer is not required to do anything other than verify employment. The judge in this case allowed work release, apparently because relator was employed when she was sentenced. The sheriff was mandated to arrange for continuation of her employment insofar as possible without interruption. I would hold that the employer’s thwarting of work release by failing to verify employment, thereby making the employee unable to attend work, should not result in a determination that the employee engaged in misconduct.
An at-will employer may certainly terminate an employee’s employment for being convicted of a crime, and such a termination may result in a determination that the employee was terminated for misconduct. But relator’s employment was not terminated for her conviction. She was terminated because the employer made it impossible for her to take advantage of an important correctional tool provided by the legislature and imposed by the judge in this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742195. Public record. Not legal advice.
