# People v. Syverson > Appellate Court of Illinois · November 12, 1997 · 293 Ill. App. 3d 199 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742123 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RALPH H. SYVERSON, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** November 12, 1997 - **Citations:** 293 Ill. App. 3d 199; 227 Ill. Dec. 278; 687 N.E.2d 528; 1997 Ill. App. LEXIS 786 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Holdridge - **Judges:** Homer, Holdridge - **Cited by:** 4 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Overruled in part by People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91 (1999). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742123 ## Opinion text JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the home invasion and the murder were not part of a "single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.” 730 ILCS Ann. 5/5 — 8—4(a) (Michie 1994). The relevant statutory language provides: "The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 — 13 or 12 — 14 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.” 730 ILCS Ann. 5/5 — 8—4(a) (Michie 1994). The issue in this matter is whether the home invasion and the second degree murder were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. My review of the record leads me to conclude that these offenses were not part of a single course of conduct. While I agree with the majority’s position that some degree of uncertainty exists as to the meaning of this statutory provision, I do not agree that the application of a "totality of the circumstances” brings any greater degree of clarity to the issue than the other methods of analysis articulated by other courts. Rather, I believe that the language of subsection 5 — 8—4(a) and the case law interpreting that subsection do not mandate consecutive sentences where there are separate and distinct acts or where various acts are separately motivated. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 133 Ill. App. 3d 620 (1985). In other words, where there is an "independent motivation” for the various acts, consecutive sentences are not mandated. See, e.g. People v. Harris, 220 Ill. App. 3d 31, 32 (1991). Here, the record is clear that the jury found that defendant’s acts were not within a "single course of conduct during which there was no change in the nature of the criminal objective.” The jury’s verdicts on each of the charged offenses can lead to only one conclusion. The jury found, not a single course of conduct on the part of the defendant, but rather two separate and distinct criminal acts. The jury found the defendant guilty — simply guilty, not guilty but mentally ill — of home invasion, thereby finding that the defendant, without mental impairment of any kind, had entered his wife’s apartment and threatened harm upon persons within the apartment. The jury also found that the defendant, while suffering from a mental impairment — the disassociative reaction — then proceeded to kill Rapp while in the heat of passion. There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from the jury’s conflicting verdicts on the two offenses: that each offense was motivated by a completely different criminal objective, and thus the two offenses were not part of a single course of conduct. Clearly, the jury found that the defendant acted under no mental impairment when he broke into the apartment while armed with a dangerous weapon, but he was motivated to shoot Rapp by something that happened while the defendant was in the apartment, which acted upon his mental impairment to produce a completely different criminal objective from the defendant’s objective in entering the apartment. In other words, the jury’s verdicts, guilty of offense of home invasion and guilty but mentally ill of the offense of second degree murder, establish that the defendant entered the apartment without the intent to kill Rapp but was motivated to kill him only after entering the apartment. Where independent motivations exist for each offense, consecutive sentences are not mandated by subsection 5 — 8—4(a). See People v. Williams, 60 Ill. 2d 1 (1975) (proper finding of independent motivation for offenses where defendant entered building to commit robbery but then wound up killing person in the building). As I would find that the two offenses for which the defendant was sentenced were not part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, I would not address the issue of whether one of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily harm. For the foregoing reasons, I would find that the trial court erred in finding that consecutive sentences were mandated by subsection 5 — 8—4(a). I therefore dissent. I would remand the matter for the trial court to determine whether consecutive sentences, while not mandatory, were nonetheless otherwise warranted. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9742123. Public record. Not legal advice.