# People v. P.H.

> Illinois Supreme Court · October 31, 1991 · 145 Ill. 2d 209

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9741517

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. P.H., a Minor, Appellee
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 31, 1991
- **Citations:** 145 Ill. 2d 209; 164 Ill. Dec. 137; 582 N.E.2d 700; 1991 Ill. LEXIS 105
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Miller
- **Judges:** Freeman, Miller, Cunningham
- **Cited by:** 152 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9741517

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a statute that removes a case from a judge sitting in the juvenile division to a judge sitting in the criminal division of the same circuit is not a divestiture of jurisdiction as the circuit court retains juris- diction over the minor defendant
- rejecting separation of powers challenge to provision in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, ¶ 805-4(3.1)
- holding that "gang-transfer" statute was constitutional

## Opinion text

CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the court in this appeal, but write separately because the majority opinion leaves open the question of what standard of proof applies in transfer determinations under the “gang-transfer” statute. Unlike the majority, I would decide the question at this time and determine that probable cause is the correct standard.
The question should be decided now for two reasons. First, as the majority notes (145 Ill. 2d at 235), Kent v. United States (1966), 838 U.S. 541 , holds that standards in juvenile transfer statutes must be clear in order to comport with the requirements of due process. While Kent is mainly concerned with the factual criteria for transfer and the “gang-transfer” criteria are already clear, it would obviously aid in the consistent application of those criteria for this court to specify what standard of proof applies in such proceedings. Second, it would be helpful to provide guidance to the juvenile courts and would avoid further questions on the issue in the future.
The majority opinion does not clearly indicate what standard of proof applies in “gang-transfer” proceedings. Nevertheless, the majority properly rejects the defendant’s assertion that a reasonable doubt standard applies. (145 Ill. 2d at 225.) The opinion further states that it is “a more reasonable inference that the standard of proof required by the ‘gang-transfer’ provision parallel[s] that in other transfer proceedings.” (145 Ill. 2d at 225.) I agree. The same purposes and procedures that apply to a discretionary transfer proceeding apply to a “gang-transfer” proceeding. The only difference is the criteria applied. I see no language in the “gang-transfer” statute to indicate a different standard of proof and thus I see no reason why the same standard of proof should not apply to both proceedings.
In People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289 , this court examined the constitutionality of the discretionary transfer statute. The court held there that “the State need only present evidence sufficient to persuade the trial court, in the sound exercise of its discretion, that in light of the statutorily prescribed criteria transfer is warranted.” ( 76 Ill. 2d at 303-04 . See also People v. D.B. (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 194, 201 ; People v. Cater (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 983, 987 ; People v. Stocks (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 439, 445 (clear and convincing standard does not apply).) While Taylor does not explicitly hold that probable cause is the applicable standard of proof in discretionary transfer proceedings, Taylor does imply that probable cause is the correct standard. In Taylor the court rejected a clear and convincing standard (Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 302 ), and stated that “the greater the evidence of guilt required to be submitted by the State, the greater the likelihood of double jeopardy problems with the subsequent trial.” (Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 304 .) More importantly, as the majority notes (145 Ill. 2d at 227), the court in Taylor also observed that the Uniform Juvenile Court Act “suggests only a probable cause standard.” (Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 304 .) Taken together, I believe Taylor and the majority opinion imply that probable cause is the correct standard for both discretionary transfer and “gang-transfer” proceedings.
Two other reasons support my conclusion that probable cause is the proper standard. First, one of the criteria for transfer under the discretionary transfer statute is “whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 805—4(3)(b)(l).) Because the standard of proof in grand jury proceedings is probable cause (see Phillips v. Graham (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 274, 284 ), the statute suggests that the General Assembly contemplated a probable cause standard in discretionary transfer proceedings. Second, the majority concludes that transfer proceedings are not adjudicatory, but instead are highly analogous to preliminary hearings where the probable cause standard is applied. (145 Ill. 2d at 228, citing People v. Bonner (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 553, 557 .) I agree with that analogy. Transfer proceedings and preliminary hearings are both pretrial proceedings which have as their purpose the determination of whether the State may proceed with criminal charges. I believe it appropriate to apply the same standard of proof in both cases.
In order to clarify the procedures to be used in “gang-transfer” proceedings, I believe that we should decide here that probable cause is the applicable standard of proof in these proceedings. The majority opinion is not inconsistent with this conclusion.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM joins in this special concurrence.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9741517. Public record. Not legal advice.