# Cook v. State

> Supreme Court of Iowa · November 23, 1988 · 431 N.W.2d 800

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9740833

## Case

- **Full name:** Carl Richard COOK, Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** November 23, 1988
- **Citations:** 431 N.W.2d 800; 1988 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 315; 1988 WL 124288
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Neuman
- **Judges:** Carter, Lavorato, Neuman, Schultz
- **Cited by:** 13 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9740833

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting experts may not “state opinions as to legal standards”

## Opinion text

NEUMAN, Justice,
(dissenting).
Though I share the majority’s dismay at the result reached in this case, I cannot yield to the reason advanced for upsetting the trial court’s verdict. The question is not whether Cook, as a matter of law, violated the right-of-way provisions of Iowa Code section 321.322. Cook concedes he ran the stop sign. The question is whether, and to what extent, the State’s lack of due care contributed to, or caused, Cook’s failure to heed the traffic signal. That determination, of course, lies somewhere on a continuum from zero to 100 percent. .To suggest that Cook’s fault can be determined as a matter of law, or that the court committed reversible error by failing to recognize Cook’s traffic violation, is to miss the point of the case.
The point meriting our attention is the judgment call made by the trial court about *809 why Cook missed the stop sign. Having heard the evidence first hand, the court pegged the State’s culpability at ninety percent for negligent signing, and Cook’s alcohol-impaired driving at ten percent. Had we tried the case, we might have factored those contributing causes quite differently. But absent a showing that the trial court’s judgment was manifestly erroneous or the product of passion or prejudice, it should not be disturbed. I would affirm.
CARTER and LAVORATO, JJ., join this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9740833. Public record. Not legal advice.