# Carlson v. Village of Worth

> Illinois Supreme Court · February 5, 1976 · 62 Ill. 2d 406

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9739859

## Case

- **Full name:** HARRY A. CARLSON, Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF WORTH, Appellant
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** February 5, 1976
- **Citations:** 62 Ill. 2d 406; 343 N.E.2d 493; 1976 Ill. LEXIS 474
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Underwood
- **Judges:** Schaefer, Ryan, Underwood, Ward
- **Cited by:** 37 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9739859

## Opinion text

MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, also dissenting:
I agree with Mr. Justice Ryan in his discussion relating to the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency. I also agree generally that existing statutes conferring power upon non-home-rule municipalities to legislate upon environmental matters of purely local concern have not been abrogated, and that O’Connor has been too broadly read if it is thought to indicate the contrary. I do not interpret the majority opinion here to preclude local legislation by non-home-rule municipalities under existing statutory authority except as that legislation may affect environmental areas of more than purely local concern or is inconsistent with the Environmental Protection Act.
My greater concern with the opinion of the court, however, is the implied overruling of our recent decision in City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board, 59 Ill.2d 484 , which became final only last year. It seems to me the inference to be drawn from the majority opinion here is that because City of Chicago misinterpreted, as a grant of authority to municipalities to legislate in the environmental area, certain language in the Environmental Protection Act which was not so intended, and because legislative efforts to expressly delegate that authority were defeated, the State has totally preempted the area of environmental regulation. Whatever their relevance to the authority of non-home-rule units may be, those facts are not relevant in any discussion of preemption of the power of a home rule unit of local government. A home rule unit derives its powers from section 6 of article VII of our 1970 Constitution, and, except as limited by that section, “may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs.” Unless the General Assembly exercises its preemption responsibilities under paragraphs (g) or (h) of section 6, that body’s actions or failure to act cannot inhibit the authority of a home rule unit.
Whether a home rule unit has power to enact a given ordinance is, in my judgment, determined by two questions: (1) Does the subject matter pertain to its government and affairs? (2) If so, has that power been limited or denied it by the General Assembly under 6(g) or 6(h)? Those questions are not considered, nor could they properly be, in the court’s opinion in this case since the issue here does not involve a home rule municipality.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9739859. Public record. Not legal advice.