# Owen v. Mann

> Illinois Supreme Court · February 22, 1985 · 105 Ill. 2d 525

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9739575

## Case

- **Full name:** ROBERT D. OWEN Et Al., Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD E. MANN, Judge, Et Al., Defendants
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** February 22, 1985
- **Citations:** 105 Ill. 2d 525; 86 Ill. Dec. 507; 475 N.E.2d 886; 1985 Ill. LEXIS 196
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Goldenhersh
- **Judges:** Moran, Goldenhersh, Clark
- **Cited by:** 24 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9739575

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, after the complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, there was no way to determine whether a discovery request was relevant to the subject matter of the pending action -6- No. 1‑25‑0620 under the discovery rules

## Opinion text

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:
I dissent. I agree with the statement of Chief Justice Clark in People ex rel. Judicial Inquiry Board v. Hartel (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 225, 239 , that section 15(c) of article VI of the Constitution “was intended exclusively for the protection of judges under investigation.” As did Chief Justice Clark, “I find it persuasive that, in explaining the intent of the confidentiality provision, the drafters made no mention of an intent to protect witnesses and complainants.” 72 Ill. 2d 225, 239 .
On the theory that it is essential to the free flow of information concerning complaints against members of the judiciary, the majority has created a privilege obviously not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. This free flow of information, according to the majority, depends in part on the informant’s expectation of confidentiality “to shield him from possible recrimination by an individual subject to investigation.” 105 Ill. 2d at 533.
The majority has failed to cite any authority which supports the proposition that, once the informer is identified, the content of the information is protected from discovery. To the contrary, Professor Wigmore’s treatise on evidence makes it clear that the privilege, when it exists, applies only to the identity of the informer and not to the content of communication received from him. 8 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2374 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
Here, the identity of the informant was not confidential. His former client, in motions filed in litigation pending in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, stated that a Judicial Inquiry Board petition had been filed against Judge Starnes and that the client believed that the petition was filed by its former trial counsel (petitioner here).
If protection from possible recrimination is the purpose of confidentiality, it is accomplished by concealing the identity of the informer. When, as here, the informer broadcasts the fact that he has filed the complaint, neither logic nor the authorities proscribe the discovery of the content of the complaint.
The majority opinion serves to subject a member of the judiciary to a malicious, false and frivolous complaint without recourse on his part or fear of retribution on the part of his accuser. This, it seems to me, is too high a price to pay for the benefits allegedly derived from the free flow of information.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9739575. Public record. Not legal advice.