# Watkins v. Schmitt

> Illinois Supreme Court · April 30, 1996 · 172 Ill. 2d 193

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9738376

## Case

- **Full name:** JOANNE WATKINS, Indiv. and as Special Adm’r of the Estates of Joseph Hansen and Howard Hansen, Deceased, Appellant, v. NEIL SCHMITT Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 30, 1996
- **Citations:** 172 Ill. 2d 193; 216 Ill. Dec. 822; 665 N.E.2d 1379; 110 Educ. L. Rep. 307; 1996 Ill. LEXIS 61
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Heiple
- **Judges:** Harrison, Heiple, Nickels
- **Cited by:** 78 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9738376

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding circuit court properly barred expert reconstruction testimony concerning the speed of a car and distinguishing Zavala because “[t]he expert in Zavala was able to determine that because a reamer spins at a high velocity and has no cutting surface it could not cut but co…
- reasoning that a stopped school bus could qualify as a "special hazard" requiring reduced speed because it "interfere[d] with the way motorists drive and the flow of traffic
- stating that any evidence which would be inadmissible at trial cannot be considered by the court in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment
- stating evidence of skid marks “ ‘tends to establish excessive speed’ ” (quoting Young v. Patrick, 323 Ill. 200, 202 (1926))

## Opinion text

JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
My sole disagreement with the majority is its refusal to allow the testimony of the accident reconstruction expert as to the speed of the cement truck. Relying on Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill. 2d 353 (1979), the majority opines that since the speed of a vehicle is not beyond the ken of the average juror, and since eyewitnesses are available to testify, then the testimony of the accident reconstruction expert is not necessary. 172 Ill. 2d at 204-05. As this court previously pointed out in Zavala v. Powermatic, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 542, 546 (1995), quoting Plank v. Holman, 46 Ill. 2d 465, 471 (1970), "expert reconstruction testimony is proper, even where there is an eyewitness, if what the expert offers is 'knowledge and application of principles of science beyond the ken of the average juror.’ ” Just so.
We have here a matter of physics involving weight, mass, measured skid marks, weather, pavement friction and surface conditions, all of which lend themselves to scientific analysis from an expert relative to the speed of the cement truck. While eyewitnesses to a moving vehicle can and should be allowed to testify as to its speed, the reliability of such testimony is problematical. To deny the supplementation of such testimony with the testimony of a qualified scientific expert interferes with the truthseeking function of a trial. Accordingly, I specially concur and dissent as noted.
JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this partial special concurrence and partial dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9738376. Public record. Not legal advice.