# Brown v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co.

> Appellate Court of Illinois · May 1, 1995 · 208 Ill. Dec. 737

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737938

## Case

- **Full name:** MARK L. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R.R. DONNELLY AND SONS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** May 1, 1995
- **Citations:** 208 Ill. Dec. 737; 272 Ill. App. 3d 94; 650 N.E.2d 8; 1995 Ill. App. LEXIS 305
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Cook
- **Judges:** Steigmann, Cook
- **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737938

## Opinion text

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I cannot agree that an employee relations manual which states that it is company policy to assure that every employee gets "[an] impartial hearing and handling of complaints,” and that it is company practice to "[b]ase all separations on verified facts, not on anyone’s whim or unsupported opinion,” is too vague to constitute a contract. A fair reading of the language is that employees are entitled to a hearing and will not be discharged without cause. The words "it is Company practice to,” or "it is Company policy to,” indicate that the procedures mentioned will be followed unless there is some reason to do otherwise. No such reason has been suggested in this case. Perhaps the company was free to change its policies at any time, but the policies were effective until it did so.
The majority’s argument is inconsistent with Mitchell-.
" Tf there is in effect a policy to dismiss for cause only, the employer may not depart from that policy at whim simply because he was under no obligation to institute the policy in the first place. Having announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory. Toussaint [v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield (1980), 408 Mich. 579, 619 , 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 .]’ ” Mitchell, 142 Ill. 2d at 171, 568 N.E.2d at 835.
Defendant relies on Rudd as support for the proposition that "[a]rticulated procedures are a fundamental and necessary part of an employment contract.” (Rudd, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 1012, 550 N.E.2d at 676.) The provisions quoted above are brief, but a contract need not be wordy to be clear. In Mitchell, the supreme court found an employee was not terminable at will where the employee handbook provided permanent employees could only be terminated for "just cause,” although the handbook did not describe any termination procedure, and gave only a nonexhaustive list of examples of "just cause.” (Mitchell, 142 Ill. 2d at 162, 568 N.E.2d at 831.) Rudd is a much easier case than the present one. In Rudd, the manual provided for progressive discipline, but further provided that progressive discipline might include immediate termination.
. We should be careful equating employment manual guidelines with contractual obligations, but employers can protect themselves without arguing that they did not mean what they said. Illinois courts have repeatedly found that an employee handbook is not reasonably interpreted as part of the contract for employment when the manual contains language that disclaims the creation of a contract of employment. (See, e.g., Spann v. Springfield Clinic (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 419 , 577 N.E.2d .488.) There was no disclaimer here.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737938. Public record. Not legal advice.