# Riley v. State

> Indiana Supreme Court · May 11, 1999 · 711 N.E.2d 489

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737398

## Case

- **Full name:** William Edward RILEY, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 11, 1999
- **Citations:** 711 N.E.2d 489; 1999 Ind. LEXIS 306; 1999 WL 322994
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Sullivan
- **Judges:** Boehm, Dickson, Selby, Shepard, Sullivan
- **Cited by:** 44 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737398

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding evidence that defendant was familiar with drug jargon and prices, that he engaged in multiple transactions, and that he undertook to arrange future transactions was sufficient to show that defendant was predisposed to dealing in controlled substances and was not entrap…
- acknowledging that while the generally accepted procedure in answering a jury’s question on a matter of law is to reread all instructions in order to avoid emphasizing any particular point, departure from this procedure is permitted when the jury question coincides with a lega…
- stating generally accepted procedure in answering jury's question on matter of law is to reread all instructions to avoid emphasizing any particular point and not to qualify, modify, or explain instructions in any way
- finding that legislature intended to use entire weight of substance “as this encompasses the common understanding of those in the drug trade”
- holding entire contents of packages sold by defendant that tested positive for cocaine were properly included in total weight of the drug

## Opinion text

SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s opinion except for its resolution of the claim discussed under the caption, “Insufficient Evidence of Dealing-in Purported Controlled Substance.”
The defendant stands convicted of Dealing in a Substance Represented to Be a Controlled Substance. Ind.Code § 35-48-4-4.5(a)(1) (1993). To secure a conviction on this charge, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally delivered or financed the delivery of a substance that, while not a controlled substance or prescription drug, was “expressly or impliedly represented to he a controlled substance.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
As the majority acknowledges, the defendant did not tell the undercover police officer that he was selling cocaine but “bogeyman,” a substance that resembles but is not cocaine. The defendant did not represent the substance to be a controlled substance. Rather, the defendant expressly represented that the substance was “bogeyman,” which is not a controlled substance. The evidence does not support conviction on this charge.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737398. Public record. Not legal advice.
